



**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE  
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

Patent Examiner: John K. Ford :  
Group Art Unit: 3753 : **HEAT EXCHANGE ASSEMBLY**  
In re application of:  
GEOFFREY R. MORRIS :  
Serial No.: 09/674,256 :  
Filed: December 22, 2000 : Attorney Docket No. 282318-00008

**APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL**

March 18, 2004

Commissioner For Patents  
MAIL STOP APPEAL BRIEF - PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Dear Sir:

This is an Appeal from the decision of the Examiner dated November 12, 2003 rejecting claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12, and 14-16 of the above-identified application. The claims are set forth in Appendix A, which is attached hereto. Due to the specific nature of the issues involved in this Appeal, an Oral Hearing is not deemed necessary and is not requested.

**Real Party In Interest**

The real party in interest is the inventor, Geoffrey R. Morris.

**Related Appeals and Interferences:**

There are no other appeals or interferences known to Appellant or to Appellant's legal representative which will directly affect, be directly affected by, or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal.

### **Status of the Claims**

Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by AU 696305.

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by, or in the alternative under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over, *Saperstein et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,242,015.

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Saperstein* further in view of JP 61-202084.

Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Saperstein* or *Saperstein*/JP '084 further in view of *Kennon* 6,173,767.

### **Status of the Amendments**

There are currently no amendments to the pending claims. The claims as they stand on Appeal are contained in the Appendix A to this Brief.

### **The Invention**

The present invention provides a heat exchange assembly that may be used as a roofing panel. The heat exchange assembly includes an internal fluid passageway formed between a pair of spaced substantially parallel internal sheets for the passage therethrough of a fluid, respective external passageways formed between each internal sheet and a respective external sheet spaced from and substantially parallel to a respective internal sheet, and, a manifold structured to direct the fluid flow through the passageways. The sheets can be separated by any suitable spacing means such as posts or the like, however, it is preferred that the heat exchange assembly includes spacing ribs between the sheets and forming with the sheets a plurality of fluid conduits within the fluid passageway and a plurality of external conduits within the external passageways.

The heat exchange assembly further includes a fluid inlet means at one end of the fluid conduits for the inflow of fluid in the heat exchange assembly, and fluid outlet means at the other end of the fluid conduits for the outflow of fluid from the heat exchange assembly. The external passageways can contain another liquid

however, it is preferred that the external passageways are adapted to receive or contain a gas for effecting heat exchange between the fluid in the fluid passageway and the exterior of the heat exchange assembly.

The heat exchange assembly can be of any suitable shape and configuration consistent with the above. However, it is preferred that the heat exchange assembly constitutes a panel sealed at the sides thereof by the spacing ribs and open at the ends thereof to provide access to the conduits which extend from one end of the panel to the other end thereof. Fluid and/or gas supplies may be connected directly to the respective conduits at the ends of the panel. However, it is preferred that the heat exchange assembly includes an inlet manifold and an outlet manifold at respective ends of the panel. Preferably the inlet manifold and the outlet manifold include the fluid inlet means and the fluid outlet means, respectively. The inlet manifold and the outlet manifold also preferably include the gas inlet means and the gas outlet means, respectively.

#### **Issues Presented**

1. Whether the appellant's invention as claimed in Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 are anticipated by AU 696305.
2. Whether the appellant's invention as claimed in Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 are anticipated by, or in the alternative are obvious over, *Saperstein et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,242,015.
3. Whether the appellant's invention as claimed in Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 are unpatentable over Saperstein in view of JP 61-202084.
4. Whether the appellant's invention as claimed in Claims 9 and 10 are unpatentable over Saperstein or Saperstein/JP '084 in view of Kennon 6,173,767.

#### **Grouping of Claims**

Claims 1, 12 and 16 each stand separately. Claims 2-5, 9 and 10 stand or fall with Claim 1. Claims 14 and 15 stand or fall with Claim 12.

#### **Argument**

Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16; Rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)

Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by AU 696305. A copy of AU 696305 has been provided with a Supplemental Information Disclosure Statement filed on January 15, 2004. As noted on its face, AU 696305 is an Australian Petty Patent that claimed priority from Australian Provisional Patent PP3292. The Australian Provisional Patent PP3292 was filed on April 29, 1998. The Australian Petty Patent AU 696305 was filed on May 21, 1998. The present Application claims priority from PCT/AU99/00320 which, in turn, claimed priority from Australian Provisional Patent PP3292. Thus, both the reference, Australian Petty Patent AU 696305, and the present Application both claim priority from the same initial filing, namely, Australian Provisional Patent PP3292.

Accordingly, the Examiner is in error when he states that “Appellant failed to claim priority in PCT/AU99/00320 back to the earliest priority document ...” and the rejection of Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by AU 696305 should be reversed.

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14; Rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by or, in the alternative under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as obvious over *Saperstein et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,242,015. Appellant notes that in the original rejection of these claims under this reference, the Examiner stated that the reference disclosed a “panel,” which the Examiner defined as “a flat ...part of a surface,” and used this disclosure as a basis to reject claims 1-4 which recited the use of “sheets.” Thus, the Examiner appears to have equated the words “panel” and “sheet.” In the final rejection, however, in the Examiner faults the Appellant for using the Examiner’s language noting that the claims do not recite a “flat panel.” On one hand, this distinction is irrelevant as the art cited by the Examiner fails to disclose either a flat panel or a sheet. On the other hand, to fully respond to the Examiner’s comments, Appellant notes that a “sheet.” is defined as “a large thin **flat** especially rectangular piece of something.” *See*, Cambridge Online Dictionary at, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/> (emphasis added)(attached as Appendix B). Thus, while the word “flat” was not recited in the claims, the concept of a flat structure is

subsumed in the recitation of a “sheet.” Moreover, the statement that the heat exchanger may “be of any suitable shape and configuration consistent with the above” does support the Examiner’s contention that the heat exchanger is not necessarily flat. To be “consistent with the above” the heat exchanger must include a “sheet” which, as defined, must be flat.

Finally, the Examiner has cited DT 2543326 for the proposition that not all panels are flat. More specifically, the Examiner has indicated the element associated with reference number 9, identified in the specification as “gebogenen Platten,” is a panel which is not flat. Appellant notes that “gebogenen Platten” is translated as “bent plate.” Appellant agrees that if the specification had identified sheets (or “panel” to the extent the Examiner considered the terms equivalent) as being “bent,” the sheets would not necessarily be flat. However, in both the specification and the claims, the word “sheet” is not modified by any adjective that provides a basis for the Examiner’s contention that the sheet is not flat.

Turning to the cited art, Appellant notes that the Examiner has failed to support the contention that *Saperstein* discloses a “panel.” That is, *Saperstein* discloses, in Figures 6-8 as cited by the Examiner, a heat exchanger coil having two separate inlet and outlet pipes coupled to the separate fluid passageways of the heat exchanger. The Examiner contends that the coil of *Saperstein* is the equivalent to a flat panel. More specifically, as stated in the Office Action dated September 9, 2002, at the bottom of page two, the Examiner states that, “[a] ‘panel’ is a flat, usually rectangular piece forming a part of a surface.” The Examiner also stated that the coil-like structure of *Saperstein*, which is identified by reference number 100, is a “panel.”

Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s contention. That is, while Appellant agrees that a panel is “a flat, usually rectangular piece forming a part of a surface,” Appellant disagrees that the coil-like structure of *Saperstein* is “a flat, usually rectangular piece forming a part of a surface.” First, it is axiomatic that a flat panel must be, by definition, flat. The coil of *Saperstein* is, also by definition, a coil and cannot be “flat.” Moreover, although *Saperstein* does not disclose any specific dimensions, as shown in Figure 8, the body of the coil element has a height that is significantly larger than the width of the coil element. Second, the coil shape of

*Saperstein* is not even the equivalent to a flat panel as used in a heat exchanger. Flat panels have different heat transfer properties than a coil. That is, the speed, turbulence, and other fluid flow characteristics of a fluid passing through a panel are different from a fluid passing through a coil. Accordingly, given that a “panel” must be flat, the Examiner has not adequately supported the contention that the coil of *Saperstein* is either flat or the equivalent of a panel. Similarly, because the *Saperstein* coil is not flat, *Saperstein* also fails to disclose, or even suggest, a “sheet.”

As stated in MPEP §2131:

A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference....

The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim.

*Verdigaal Brothers v. Union Oil Company of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) and *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Company*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, (Fed. Cir. 1989). It is respectfully submitted that upon reading the *Saperstein disclosure*, one skilled in the art would not consider a heat exchanger having parallel sheets as recited in claim 1.

Independent claim 1 recites a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As this reference fails to disclose, or even suggest, a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner’s rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), or in the alternative under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), is in error.

Claims 2-5 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 and rely on their dependency for patentability.

Independent claim 12 recites a roofing panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As this reference fails to disclose a roofing panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner’s rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), or in the alternative under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), is in error.

Claims 14 and 15 depend from claim 12 and rely on their dependency for patentability.

Independent claim 16 recites a heat exchange panel that incorporates a heat

exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As this reference fails to disclose a heat exchange panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner's rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), or in the alternative under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), is in error.

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16; Rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Saperstein* as applied to Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 above and further in view of JP 61-202084. *Saperstein* is discussed above. JP 61-202084 discloses a heat exchanger that has a first tank, a second tank and ten distinct layers of fluid passage members. The fluid passage members are divided into three fluid passages. In the upper five layers of fluid passage members, all of the fluid passages are in fluid communication with the first tank. In the lower five layers of fluid passage members, two fluid passages are in fluid communication with the first tank and the remaining fluid passage is in fluid communication with the second tank. Thus, JP 61-202084 discloses a heat exchanger tower.

It is unreasonable to conclude that one skilled in the art confronted with the prior art cited would in some fashion fragment the individual teachings thereof to obtain the present invention as recited in the claims. As stated in, *In re Geiger*, 815 F.2d 686, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1987), "obviousness cannot be established by combining teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, *absent some teaching, suggestion, or incentive supporting combination.*" (*emphasis added*) (attached as Appendix C). Put another way, "the mere fact that disclosures or teachings of the prior art can be retrospectively combined for the purpose of evaluating obviousness/nonobviousness issue does not make the combination set forth in the invention obvious, *unless the art also suggested the desirability of the combination ....*" *Rite-Hite Corp. v Kelly Co.*, 629 F.Supp. 1042, 231 U.S.P.Q. 161, (attached as Appendix D) *aff'd* 819 F.2d 1120, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (E.D.Wis. 1986) (*emphasis added*). Similarly, the court in, *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991), stated that "both the suggestion [to make the claimed apparatus] and the reasonable expectation of success must be found in the

prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure." (attached as Appendix E).

Here there is no suggestion that the cited references should be combined. In fact, the teachings of the references teach away from each other. The JP 61-202084 reference teaches a heat exchange tower having multiple layers. This is in direct opposition to the *Saperstein* reference that teaches a single layer coil-like structure.

Independent claim 1 recites a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As these references cannot be combined and fail to disclose or suggest a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner's rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is in error.

Claims 2-5 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 and rely on their dependency for patentability.

Independent claim 12 recites a roofing panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As these references cannot be combined and fail to disclose or suggest a roofing panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner's rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is in error.

Claims 14 and 15 depend from claim 12 and rely on their dependency for patentability.

Independent claim 16 recites a heat exchange panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets. As these references cannot be combined and fail to disclose or suggest a heat exchange panel that incorporates a heat exchanger having passageways formed by parallel sheets, the Examiner's rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is in error.

#### Claims 9 and 10; Rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)


Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Saperstein* or *Saperstein*/JP '084 as applied to Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 above, and further in view of *Kennon* 6,173,767. *Saperstein* and JP 61-202084 are discussed above. *Kennon* discloses a pressure relief device. As with *Saperstein* and JP 61-202084, the Examiner has failed to indicate where, in the references, there is a

“teaching, suggestion, or incentive supporting [the] combination.” Accordingly, the Examiner has failed to establish that these references may be combined to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

**Conclusion**

It is submitted that Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 are not anticipated by AU 696305 as AU 696305 is not prior art. It is further submitted that Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 are not anticipated by, and are patentable over, *Saperstein*. It is further submitted that Claims 1-5, 12 and 14-16 are patentable over *Saperstein* in view of JP 61-202084. It is further submitted that Claims 9 and 10 are patentable over *Saperstein* or *Saperstein/JP ‘084* further in view of *Kennon* 6,173,767. Therefore, it is requested that the Board reverse the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 12 and 14-16 and remand the application to the Examiner for the issuance of a Notice of Allowance.

Respectfully submitted,



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## **Appendix A**

In the Claims:

1. A heat exchange assembly including:  
an internal passageway formed between a pair of spaced substantially parallel internal sheets,  
respective external passageways formed between each said internal sheet and a respective external sheet spaced from and substantially parallel to a respective internal sheet;  
said pair of internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway extending beyond said external sheets at the ends of said external passageways thereby facilitating fusion welding to said internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway, and said internal passageway or said external passageways being adapted to receive or contain a gas for effecting heat exchange with a fluid in the other of said internal passageway or said external passageways; and  
said pair of internal sheets and said external sheets each coupled to, and said internal and external passageways in fluid communication with, at least one manifold.
  
2. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 1, and including:  
spacing ribs between said sheets and forming with said sheets a plurality of fluid conduits within said internal passageway and a plurality of external conduits within said external passageways.
  
3. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 1, and including:  
a fluid inlet means at one end of said internal passageway;  
a gas inlet means at one end of said external passageways;  
a fluid outlet means at the other end of said internal passageway;  
a gas outlet means at the other end of said external passageways; and  
said at least one manifold includes an inlet manifold coupled to, and in fluid communication with, said internal passageway fluid inlet means and said external passageway gas inlet means and an outlet manifold coupled to, and in fluid communication with, said internal passageway fluid outlet means and said external passageway gas outlet means;  
whereby said internal passageway is adapted to receive or contain a fluid and said external passageways are adapted to receive or contain a gas for effecting heat exchange with the fluid in the said internal passageway.

4. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 1, and including:  
a gas inlet means at one end of said internal passageway;  
a fluid inlet means at one end of said external passageways;  
a gas outlet means at the other end of said internal passageway;  
a fluid outlet means at the other end of said external passageways;  
said at least one manifold includes an inlet manifold coupled to, and in fluid communication with, said internal passageway gas inlet means and said external passageway fluid inlet means and an outlet manifold coupled to, and in fluid communication with, said internal passageway gas outlet means and said external passageway fluid outlet means; and

whereby said internal passageway is adapted to receive or contain a gas, said external passageways are adapted to receive or contain a fluid for effecting heat exchange with the gas in said internal passageway.

5. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 2, said assembly constituting a panel sealed at the sides thereof by said spacing ribs and open at the ends thereof to provide access to said conduits which extend from one end of the panel to the other end thereof.

9. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 2, and including:  
pressure relief means for relieving the pressure in said fluid passageway generated by heating fluid therein.

10. A heat exchange assembly as claimed in claim 9, wherein said pressure relief means is a riser positioned in said fluid inlet and/or fluid outlet means.

12. A roofing panel incorporating a heat exchange assembly, said roofing panel including:

an internal fluid passageway formed between a pair of spaced substantially parallel internal sheets for the passage therethrough of a fluid;  
respective external passageways formed between each said internal sheet and a respective external sheet spaced from and substantially parallel to a respective internal sheet,

spacing ribs between said sheets and forming with said sheets a plurality of fluid conduits within said internal fluid passageway and a plurality of external conduits within said external passageways;

said pair of internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway extending beyond said external sheets at the ends of said external passageways thereby facilitating fusion welding to said internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway, said panel being sealed at the sides thereof by said spacing ribs and being open at the ends thereof to provide access to said conduits which extend from one end of the panel to the other end thereof, and said internal passageway or said external passageways being adapted to receive or contain a gas for effecting heat exchange with a fluid in the other of said internal passageway or said external passageways; and

at least one manifold having a fluid communication means for the inflow or outflow of a fluid to or from said fluid conduits, and a gas communication means for the inflow or outflow of a gas to or from the external conduits.

14. A roofing panel as claimed in claim 12 wherein said manifold includes:

a receiving means for receiving the internal sheets and the external sheets whereby said fluid communication means and said gas communication means are sealingly connected to the fluid passageway and the external passageways respectively.

15. A roofing panel as claimed in claim 12, wherein said manifold is an extrusion and said fluid communication means and said gas communication means are channels in said extrusion.

16. A heat exchange panel including:-

an internal fluid passageway formed between a pair of spaced substantially parallel internal sheets for the passage therethrough of a fluid;

respective external passageways formed between each said internal sheet and a respective external sheet spaced from and substantially parallel to a respective internal sheet;

spacing ribs between said sheets and forming with said sheets a plurality of fluid conduits within said fluid passageway and a plurality of external conduits within said external passageways, and

manifold means including fluid communication means for the inflow or outflow of fluid to or from the fluid conduits, and gas communication means for the inflow or outflow of gas to or from the external conduits;

wherein said panel is sealed at the sides thereof by said spacing ribs and is open at the ends thereof to provide access to said conduits which extend from one end of the panel to the other end thereof, and said pair of internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway extend beyond said external sheets at the ends of said external passageways thereby facilitating fusion welding to said internal sheets at the ends of said internal passageway.

## **Appendix B**


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
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**Definition****sheet** [Show phonetics]

noun [c]

**1** a large thin flat especially rectangular piece of something, especially a piece of cloth used for sleeping on:*I've put clean sheets on the bed.**a sheet of glass**They fixed a **polythene/plastic** sheet over the broken window.***2** a piece of paper:*some sheets of wrapping paper**The application form was a single sheet of paper.***3** a piece of paper with something printed on it:*The tourist office provides a weekly information sheet about things that are happening in the town.***4 sheet of sth** a large wide mass of something such as fire or ice:*A sheet of **flame** shot up into the air immediately after the explosion.**A thick sheet of **ice** had formed over the water.***sheets** [Show phonetics]

plural noun

a large quantity of rain or hail:

*The rain was coming down **in sheets**.***sheet** [Show phonetics]

verb INFORMAL

**be sheeting** to rain very hard:*We can't go out yet, it's sheeting **down** outside.**The rain was sheeting **against** the windows.***sheeting** [Show phonetics]

noun [u]

thin material, especially cloth, plastic or metal

## **Appendix C**

firm agency determination, if, at all, on ground that agency gave for decision). On remand, the Board must determine (1) whether the positions sought by the petitioners were temporary, and if so (2) whether the petitioners were nonetheless entitled to compete for these positions since they involved functions that were transferred to the new agency.

If the Board should conclude that these three petitioners were entitled to those positions in place of the persons to whom the positions were assigned, the Board then will have to determine the relative priority of entitlement among petitioners Acerino, Anderson, and Watson to the two positions involved. Only two of these petitioners could have been entitled to the two positions all three of them are seeking. *Q. Former CSA Employees*, 762 F.2d at 984.

#### CONCLUSION

The Board decisions sustaining the separation of Mr. Pizzi, Ms. Hudgins, and Ms. Pilgrim are affirmed. The Board decisions sustaining the separations of Mr. Acerino, Ms. Anderson, and Ms. Watson are reversed, and the cases of those petitioners are remanded to the Board to determine (1) whether the two positions these former employees seek were temporary and, if they were, (2) whether the petitioners nevertheless are entitled to these positions because they are "transition" positions.

**AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.**



ness, in absence of some suggestion in prior art supporting combination which resulted in instant method. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

April 1, 1987.

Applicant appealed decision of Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which affirmed examiner's rejection of claims, on basis of obviousness, relating to method of inhibiting scale formation on and corrosion of metallic parts in cooling water systems. The Court of Appeals, Archer, Circuit Judge, held that prima facie case of obviousness was not established.

Reversed.

Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, concurred and filed opinion.

1. **Patents 1113(6)**  
Standard of review for conclusion of obviousness is correctness or error as a matter of law. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
2. **Patents 16.5**  
Obviousness cannot be established by combining teachings of prior art to produce claimed invention, absent some teaching, suggestion, or incentive supporting combination. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
3. **Patents 16.25**

Prima facie case of obviousness was not established with respect to method of inhibiting scale formation on and corrosion of metallic parts in cooling water systems by use of compositions containing sulfonated styrene/maleic anhydride copolymer, water soluble zinc compound, and organophosphorus acid compound or water soluble salt thereof; disclosures in prior art referenced in instant patent application may have made it obvious to one skilled in art to try various combinations of known scale and corrosion prevention agents disclosed, but were insufficient to establish obviousness for appellant. It is now being reissued as a published opinion.

\* This opinion issued as an unpublished opinion on December 11, 1986. On request of counsel

In re Gary E. GEIGER.  
Appeal No. 86-1103.  
United States Court of Appeals,  
Federal Circuit.

Bruce E. Peacock, Betz Laboratories, Inc., Trevose, Pa., argued, for appellant.  
Robert D. Edmonds, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Fred E. McKey, Deputy Sol.

Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,  
SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and  
ARCHER, Circuit Judge.

ARCHER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (board), Appeal No. 606-09, affirming the examiner's rejection of all remaining claims, 43-63 and 65-67, in appellant's patent application, Serial Number 373,903 (903), under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We reverse.

#### OPINION

##### Background

The '903 patent discloses a method for treating cooling water systems prone to scale formation by the addition of a composition comprised of an acrylic acid/lower alkyl/hydroxy acrylate copolymer and another polymeric component, which may be SSMA or a styrene/maleic anhydride (SMA) copolymer. The Snyder '733 patent notes that boiler and cooling water systems share a common problem in regard to scale deposit formation and that use of SMA to prevent scale in boiler water systems is known.

The Hwa patent is directed to a method for treating boiler water systems that are prone to scale formation by addition of a composition comprised of SSMA and an organo-phosphorus acid compound.

The remaining references, cited with respect to certain dependent claims, contain no suggestion to use SSMA, the specific copolymer recited in the appealed claims. Based upon the prior art and the fact that each of the three components of the composition used in the claimed method is conventionally employed in the art for treating cooling water systems, the board held that it would have been prima facie obvious, within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103, to employ these components in combination for their known functions and to optimize the amount of each additive. The board further held that data appearing in

claims 47 and 49.

1. Hwa was cited only with respect to dependent

appellant's specification, and supplemented by a declaration submitted pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.132, provided insufficient evidence of nonobviousness to rebut the prima facie case.

#### Issues

1. Whether the board erred in finding that a prima facie case of obviousness was established.
2. Assuming that a prima facie case of obviousness was established, whether the board erred in finding that appellant's objective evidence with regard to unexpected results was insufficient to rebut that prima facie case.

#### Analysis

[1] Obviousness is a question of law based upon the factual inquiries mandated in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545; 148 USPQ 459 (1966); *Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc.*, 796 F.2d 443, 447, 230 USPQ 416, 419 (Fed.Cir.1986). For a conclusion of obviousness, the standard of review is correctness or error as a matter of law. *In re Gauvrey*, 761 F.2d 671, 674, 226 USPQ 1, 3 (Fed.Cir.1985); *In re DeBlawie*, 736 F.2d 699, 703, 222 USPQ 191, 195 (Fed.Cir.1984).

Appellant contends that the PTO failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness and, consequently, that the board's affirmation of the examiner's rejections was erroneous. Appellant argues that the PTO's position represented hindsight reconstruction or, at best, established that it would have been "obvious to try" various combinations of known scale and corrosion prevention agents, including the combination recited in the appealed claims.

[2,3] We agree with appellant that the PTO has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination. *ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital*, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221

USPQ 929, 933 (Fed.Cir.1984). We are convinced that the latter are not present here. It does not suggest use of SSMA as its claimed polymeric component and does not require the presence of an organo-phosphorus acid compound or of a zinc compound. It notes that it is difficult to maintain a predetermined concentration of polyvalent metal ions, such as the zinc (II) ion, in alkaline cooling water, but states that its claimed polymeric component prevents the "polyvalent metals from becoming insoluble compounds and precipitating." Although Snyder '733 discloses use of SSMA, it is for the purpose of showing that it, or one of three other specifically recited copolymers, may be used in combination with yet another polymeric component, an acrylic acid/lower alkyl/hydroxy acrylate copolymer, to prevent scale formation. With respect to claims 47 and 49, Hwa does disclose the specifically recited organo-phosphorus acid compound. It provides, however, no suggestion to add a zinc compound to its disclosed combination of SSMA and organophosphorus acid compounds, or to use SSMA in combination with an organo-phosphorus acid compound in the treatment of a cooling water system, where the characteristics may significantly differ from those in Hwa's boiler water system.

Hwa also provides no suggestion that SSMA could prevent precipitation of the zinc (II) ion in alkaline cooling water in the manner ascribed to the polymeric component of II. At best, in view of these disclosures, one skilled in the art might find it obvious to try various combinations of these known scale and corrosion prevention agents. However, this is not the standard of 35 U.S.C. § 103. *In re Godwin*, 676 F.2d 375, 377, 198 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1978); *In re Antone*, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977); *In re Tomlinson*, 363 F.2d 928, 160 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1966).

Because we reverse on the basis of failure to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, we need not reach the issue of the sufficiency of the showing of unexpected results.

**PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,** concurring.

I agree in the court's result, but respectfully do not share the view that the PTO did not present a prima facie case that the claimed invention would have been obvious in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103. I write separately because the determination of whether a prima facie case of obviousness has been made is a critical decision that controls the evidentiary procedures and burdens before the PTO.

The claims are directed to a three-component system to control scale and corrosion in cooling water systems, the components being (1) zinc ions, (2) a copolymer of sulfonated styrene and maleic anhydride (SSMA), and (3) an organo-phosphorus acid or salt. A three-part system is described in the II reference for the same purpose, but differs from applicant's system in that the copolymer component (2) is different. There is no teaching of SSMA in the II reference. However, the Snyder '733 reference teaches SSMA in combination with other polymers to control scale in cooling water systems. The use of SSMA in copolymer with phosphonate is known to reduce scale and sludge in boilers (Hwa). Hwa does not use zinc ions, and it is known that zinc ions produce undesirable results in boilers, but the II reference states that it was known to use zinc ions alone or in combination with organo-phosphorus acids or salts to inhibit corrosion in cooling water.

Thus each of Geiger's three components must be adequate basis to support a legal conclusion of unobviousness. *In re Johnson*, 747 F.2d 1456, 1461, 223 USPQ 1220, 1224 (Fed.Cir.1984). The applicant demonstrated the exceptional corrosion inhibition achieved with his three-part system in comparison with systems containing the known corrosion inhibitors zinc ion and organophosphorus compounds. He also compared his combination with systems containing other known polymeric scale inhibitors such as those taught by II, and demonstrated that those systems did not provide the improvement in corrosion and scale control achieved with the SSMA combination. He also demonstrated that neither polyma-

prima facie case, argued that his three-component system exhibits superior properties, and that the superiority was not obvious in view of the cited references. In support of this argument the applicant relied on experimental data in the specification.

The specification contains data on the corrosion/scale control capability of various combinations of components, including data comparing the applicant's three-part system containing SSMA with other three-part systems containing other preferred scale preventing polymers of the prior art. These data showed significant superiority of applicant's system; this was not disputed. The Board nevertheless held that the prima facie case was not rebutted because the applicant did not include data showing the properties of SSMA alone, stating that "the superior performance of such compositions may be due to the superiority of SSMA vis-a-vis the other scale-preventing copolymers."

I agree with the Board to the extent that it would have been of scientific interest to include such data. However, as a matter of law I believe that the applicant's showing was reasonable and sufficient. He complied with the requirement that the comparative showing "must be sufficient to permit a conclusion respecting the relative effectiveness of applicant's claimed compounds and the compounds of the closest prior art," *In re Payne*, 606 F.2d 303, 316, 203 USPQ 245, 256 (CCPA 1979), and must "provide an adequate basis to support a legal conclusion of unobviousness." *In re Johnson*, 747 F.2d 1456, 1461, 223 USPQ 1220, 1224 (Fed.Cir.1984). The applicant demonstrated the exceptional corrosion inhibition achieved with his three-part system in comparison with systems containing the known corrosion inhibitors zinc ion and organophosphorus compounds. He also compared his combination with systems containing other known polymeric scale inhibitors such as those taught by II, and demonstrated that those systems did not provide the improvement in corrosion and scale control achieved with the SSMA combination. He also demonstrated that neither poly-

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

First Circuit

leic anhydride nor sulfonated polystyrene system, and achieved results that the Board held showed "superior performance." These results are sufficient in themselves to rebut a *prima facie* case of obviousness. See *In re De Blauw*, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed.Cir. 1984).

Turning to the rejection on the breadth of the claim language, the limitations in the claims appear to be reasonably commensurate with the disclosure. Although I do not agree with the applicant that it is incumbent on the Commissioner to offer "technical evidence", applicant's specific examples are illustrative of the limitations described in the specification, and are not in themselves further limitations. *In re Johnson*, 658 F.2d 1008, 1017, 194 USPQ 187, 195 (CCPA 1977); *In re Goffe*, 542 F.2d 564, 667, 191 USPQ 429, 431 (CCPA 1976). The Board also upheld the examiner's additional rejection that it would have been obvious to add zinc ion to the two-component SSMA/phosphonate system of Hwa. The Hwa system is for the reduction of scale and sludge at the high temperatures of steam boilers, and it was uncontested that zinc ion is not usable at high temperatures. Applicant provided data showing that the Hwa system is relatively ineffective in a cooling system. The Board did not contradict this position on its scientific merits.

The applicant compared SSMA/phosphonate (Hwa) alone, SSMA/zinc, and phosphonate/zinc, with his three-component

## DECISIONS WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINIONS

Appeal from  
and Citation  
(If reported)  
D.Mass.

| <u>Title</u>   | <u>Docket Number</u> | <u>Date</u>                   | <u>Disposition</u>        |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Wells Real Estate, Inc., <i>In re</i> . . . . . 86-2145  | 1/5/87               | DENIED                        |                           |
| Lopez Cruzado v. Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . . . 86-1357  | 1/7/87               | VACATED AND REMANDED          | D.P.R.                    |
| White v. Town of Gilford . . . . . 86-1844   | 1/7/87               | DISMISSED AND REMANDED        | D.N.H.                    |
| Filardi v. Zamora . . . . . 86-1471  | 1/8/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.P.R.                    |
| U.S. v. Baranow . . . . . 86-1779  | 1/8/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.M.                      |
| U.S. v. Myatt . . . . . 86-1780  | 1/8/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.M.                      |
| U.S. v. Bellino . . . . . 86-1781  | 1/8/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.M.                      |
| U.S. v. Campos . . . . . 86-1659   | 1/9/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.R.I.                    |
| Amelunzen v. University of Puerto Rico . . . . . 86-1533   | 1/20/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.P.R., 637 F.Supp. 426   |
| Correa v. Anderson . . . . . 86-1714   | 1/22/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.Mas.                    |
| U.S. v. Landau . . . . . 86-1800   | 1/23/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.N.H.                    |
| Khan v. I.N.S. . . . . . 86-1518   | 1/29/87              | GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED | I.N.S.                    |
| International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Ball Co. . . . . . 86-2065   | 1/29/87              | DISMISSED                     | D.P.R., 649 F.Supp. 1083  |
| Fallon, <i>In re</i> . . . . . 86-1159   | 2/3/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.M.                      |
| U.S., <i>In re</i> . . . . . 87-1003   | 2/4/87               | DENIED                        | D.N.H.                    |
| Woloshin Realty Corp. v. Delvicio . . . . . 86-1797  | 2/10/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.R.I.                    |
| Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Contractors Ass'n of Bldg. Trade Employees Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, Local Union 17 . . . . . 86-1579 | 2/12/87              | DISMISSED                     | D.Mass., 619 F.Supp. 1073 |
| Cavanaugh v. U.S. . . . . . 86-1845  | 2/13/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.Mass.                   |
| Robbins v. City of Auburn, Me. . . . . 86-1830   | 2/18/87              | DENIED; AFFIRMED              | D.M.                      |
| Font, <i>In re</i> . . . . . 87-1001   | 2/25/87              | DISMISSED                     | D.P.R.                    |
| Collins v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. Co. . . . . 86-1315   | 3/4/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.Mass., 629 F.Supp. 540  |
| Cruz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . . . 86-1879   | 3/4/87               | AFFIRMED                      | D.P.R.                    |
| Levesque, <i>In re</i> . . . . . 87-1138   | 3/6/87               | DENIED                        | D.Mas.                    |
| Charles v. West Indies Transport 86-1427   | 3/10/87              | AFFIRMED                      | D.P.R., 631 F.Supp. 1023  |



## **Appendix D**

tend equal employment opportunity related human resource development training classes as soon as practicable and shall notify this Court of compliance by filing certificate of completion, signed by the individual or organization providing such training for each employee attending. The general manager shall raise affirmatively the subject of racial harassment and discrimination with all of his employees and inform all employees that racial harassment and discrimination violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Florida Human Relations Act, and the policy of defendant itself. Moreover, a copy of this order shall be posted conspicuously in Defendant's workplace in locations where notices to employees are customarily posted for a period of sixty (60) days. Any employee seeking a copy of this Order shall be provided with one.

Further, the defendant shall institute a grievance procedure in accordance with its own policy manual which shall be designed to swiftly and effectively assure that racial harassment is eradicated. This grievance procedure shall be written in consultation with counsel for plaintiff and provided to all employees. It shall establish a system whereby harassed employees may complain to the general manager immediately and confidentially. The general manager shall be required by this grievance procedure to promptly take all necessary steps to investigate and correct any harassment or discrimination, including warnings and appropriate discipline directed at the offending party. Further, defendant shall seek to generally develop other means of preventing harassment in its work place. See *Bundy*, at 947.

The Court retains jurisdiction to monitor this injunction, upon proper motion, to assure that no discrimination occurs in the future.

[14] The plaintiff shall be entitled to all costs of this action and to reasonable attorney's fees. The Court retains jurisdiction to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

Action was brought for patent infringement. The District Court, Reynolds, Chief Judge, held that: (1) asserted claims for patent, involving restraining device used to hold truck in place while being loaded or unloaded from a loading dock, was valid and infringed, but (2) stay of injunction pending appeal would expire within 30 days of filing date of decision and order unless notice of appeal was filed within that period.

Order in accordance with opinion.  
See also, 99 F.R.D. 332.

1. Patents  $\Rightarrow$  16.1  
Failure to consider claimed invention "as a whole" in determining obviousness is an error of law. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

#### 1. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 16.1

To assert that a patent claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102, a party must demonstrate identity of invention.

#### 2. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 16.5

Factors to be considered in determining level of "ordinary skill in the art" when considering obviousness of an invention, may include educational level of one of ordinary skill, types of problems encountered in the art, prior art solution to those problems, rapidity with which innovations are made, and sophistication of the technology; not all of such factors need be considered in every case, and one or more factors may predominate or be given more weight in a particular case. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

#### 3. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 16.5

Mere fact that disclosures or teachings of prior art can be retrospectively combined for purposes of evaluating obviousness/nonobviousness issue does not make the combination set forth in the invention obvious, unless the art also suggested desirability of the combination, inventor's beneficial results, or advantage to be derived from combining the teachings. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

#### 4. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 36.1(3, 4, 5), 36.2(1)

Objective evidence of nonobviousness of an invention includes whether patented invention fulfills long-felt need in industry to which it applied, whether others tried and failed to meet the need which the invention ultimately satisfied, whether the patented invention met with substantial success upon its introduction to the market, and whether the accused infringer recognized that the invention was truly meritorious. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

#### 5. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 36.1(5)

In determining nonobviousness of patented invention, imitation of invention by alleged infringer is strong evidence of what the world ought to think. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

#### 6. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 27(1)

To assert that a patent claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102, a party must demonstrate identity of invention.

#### 7. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 314(6)

Determination that a claimed invention is "anticipated" under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 is a factual determination.

#### B. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 72(1)

Party which seeks finding that patent claim was anticipated must show that each and every element of patent claim is found, as arranged in the claim, either expressly or implicitly described under appropriate principles of inherency, in single prior art reference, or that claimed invention was previously known or embodied in single prior art reference, or that claimed invention was previously known or embodied in single prior art device or practice. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102.

#### 9. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 312(1)

Burden of patent owner in proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence extends to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as well as to literal infringement. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).

#### 10. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 226

Issue of infringement of a patent raises at least two questions: what is patented, and has what is patented been made, used, or sold by another. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).

#### 11. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 226.6

In patent infringement action, patent claims measure invention and define boundaries of patent protection. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).

#### 12. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 226.6

If allegedly infringing product falls literally within patent claim when words are given their proper meaning, infringement of patent is made out, and that is the end of the inquiry. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 112, 271(a).

#### 13. Patents $\Rightarrow$ 226.6

Question of patent infringement is resolved by comparing accused device with claims of the patent, not with the structure described in the patent or the patentee's commercial device. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 112, 271(a).

14. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  16(1)

Claims of a patent are to be construed in light of the specification, and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

15. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  16(1) Each patent claim must be considered as defining a separate invention.

16. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  16(3)

Patentee's claim covers all combinations which utilize as the stated means the structure described in the specification for performing the stated function and also all combinations that utilize any structure which is the equivalent of that described structure insofar as it performs the stated function. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

22. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  237

"Doctrine of equivalents" adds latitude and breadth to application of patent claim language to prevent infringer from perpetrating a fraud on the patent; the doctrine is designed to protect a patentee from an infringer who appropriates the invention even if the infringer avoids the literal language of the claim. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

Range of equivalents to which a patent claim is entitled is on a sliding scale depending on the nature of the invention. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

24. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  173

When patented invention has had significant commercial success or is of the pioneer type, patent claims are to be construed liberally and are not to be limited to identical means and mode of operation shown in the patent. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

25. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  173, 174

Broad protection is given not only to so-called pioneer patents, but patents that make substantial contribution to existing art and patents that consist of combination of old ingredients that produce new and useful results. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

17. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  165(1)

In construing a "means plus function" claim, a number of factors may be considered: language of claim, patent specification, prosecution history of patent, other claims in patent, and expert testimony; once such factors are weighed, scope of the "means" claim may be determined. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

Issue as to whether a device is an equivalent of the described embodiment of the patent claim in issue is a question of fact. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

19. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  234, 239, 240

Alleged infringer cannot escape infringement by mere fact that its invention is more or less efficient than subject matter claimed by patent owner or performs additional functions or adds features or is an improvement. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

20. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  226, 6 Narrow patent claim limitations cannot be read into broader claims to avoid infringement. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

21. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  165(2) Claims of a patent are the measure of the protected invention. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

"Means plus function" adds latitude and breadth to application of patent claim language to prevent infringer from perpetrating a fraud on the patent; the doctrine is designed to protect a patentee from an infringer who appropriates the invention even if the infringer avoids the literal language of the claim. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

29. Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  10, 14, 235(2)

Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of patent involving restraining device used to hold a truck in place while being loaded or unloaded from a loading dock were valid and infringed.

30. Federal Courts  $\Leftrightarrow$  685

Even though notice of appeal had not yet been filed, district court had authority to grant stay of injunction pending appeal conditioned on movant's filing of notice of appeal within a specified period. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 62(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

31. Federal Courts  $\Leftrightarrow$  685

District court may in its discretion suspend final judgment granting injunction if party seeking suspension of judgment pending appeal can show that it is likely to prevail on merits on appeal; it will suffer irreparable injury unless stay is granted, stay would not substantially harm other parties to the litigation, and stay is in the public interest. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 62(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

32. Federal Courts  $\Leftrightarrow$  685

Showing of absolute probability of success on the merits on appeal need not be made in order to obtain stay of injunction pending appeal if injunction would destroy status quo, irreparably harming appellant, and grant of stay would cause only slight harm to appellee. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 62(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

33. Federal Courts  $\Leftrightarrow$  685Patents  $\Leftrightarrow$  324, 1

Stay pending appeal, without bond, of injunction enjoining competitor from infringing patent would expire within 30 days of filing date of decision and order granting the injunction unless notice of appeal was filed within that period. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 62(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

This is an action in patent infringement suit. Stein, Neuman, Williams, Anderson & Olson, Chicago, Ill. and Gilbert W. Church, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs. Glenn O. Starke, Andrus, Seales, Starke & Sawall, and Matthew J. Flynn, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

## DECISION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

This is an action in patent infringement and unfair competition. Federal jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1338. The plaintiffs, Rite-Hite Corporation ("Rite-Hite") and its independent representatives seek a judgment that a truck restraining device manufactured and distributed by defendant Kelley Company, Inc. ("Kelley") infringes a patent owned by Rite-Hite, and that Kelley has competed unfairly by its use of a promotional film. Kelley has counterclaimed, alleging that Rite-Hite's patent is obvious in view of the prior art and is therefore void, and that Rite-Hite has competed unfairly.

The parties have agreed that the issues of liability and damages be tried separately. Rite-Hite also applied for preliminary injunctive relief with respect to its claim of unfair competition respecting Kelley's promotional film, and Kelley was enjoined from further use of unexpurgated versions of the film by the Court's order of March 16, 1984. Kelley was subject to this order at the time the issues of liability on the patent claims and Kelley's claims of unfair competition were tried to the Court.

The foregoing claims were tried to the Court between May 20 and May 29, 1985. At the close of the proceedings, I stated:

I am persuaded that the evidence compels a decision that the patent is valid. It was not obvious. And I am sorry that I have to find that the patent was infringed.

I do not believe the infringement was willful. I think that the Kelley people, in the spirit of good competition, Rite-Hite came out with a product, and they wanted to meet the product and they did the

Theodore W. Anderson, Arthur W. Olson, Jr., Lawrence E. Apolzon & Roger H.

best they could and certainly did not intend to infringe on that patent, but I think the evidence compels me to find that they did.

As far as the unfair competition issues involved, the use of the injunctive powers of the federal court I think should be used very sparingly. I don't think there is any irreparable injury on either side as far as this advertising. The film has not been used for a couple years, or at least since we had the hearing on preliminary injunction. I see no reason for the Court in the exercise of its discretion and injunctive powers to be issuing—equity powers, issuing any more injunctions for either side.

The plaintiffs were then directed to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a period of time allotted to defendant to comment thereon. The plaintiffs have filed their submission, the defendant has objected to certain provisions, and the plaintiffs have responded to the objections. Kelley has also moved for a stay of the injunction pending appeal, and Rite-Hite opposed this motion. I am persuaded that certain of the objections should be sustained, but that others would direct an outcome favoring the defendant and are not supported by the evidence. What follows, therefore, are essentially the findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by plaintiffs with exceptions where a defense objection has been sustained by the Court in view of the evidence presented at trial.

## 1. FINDINGS OF FACT

### A. Parties and Jurisdiction

1. Plaintiff Rite-Hite is a Wisconsin corporation having its principal place of business at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The other plaintiffs are Rite-Hite's independent and exclusive sales representatives throughout the country.

2. Defendant Kelley is also a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

3. Rite-Hite and Kelley, together, are dominant factors in the dock leveler industry.

try and have been keen competitors since Rite-Hite was founded in 1965.

4. This is an action for patent infringement arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and venue lies in this district under U.S.C. § 1400(b).

5. There are also claims and counter-claims for unfair competition arising under the statutory and common laws of the State of Wisconsin. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b).

### B. History of the Case

6. This action was initiated in early 1983, shortly after the patent-in-suit issued. Rite-Hite charged Kelley with infringement of U.S. Patent 4,373,847 (the '847 patent), as well as with unfair competition. On a preliminary injunction motion, the unfair competition court was heard by this Court on February 27 and 28, 1984. A decision was rendered in favor of Rite-Hite on March 16, 1984, granting a preliminary injunction enjoining use of a motion picture film which appeared to characterize unfairly Rite-Hite's Dot-Lok product.

7. Rite-Hite subsequently filed a motion for intervention on behalf of certain independent and exclusive Rite-Hite sales representatives, and the motion was granted. A trial was held before the Court in this action from May 20 through May 29, 1985. The main issues were (1) whether or not the defendant Kelley has infringed the '847 patent owned by the plaintiff Rite-Hite, and under which the other plaintiffs—Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., et al.—have certain exclusive territorial rights, and (2) whether Kelley could carry its burden that the '847 patent is invalid. The remaining issues relate to unfair competition and are mentioned further below.

### C. Rite-Hite's Background

8. Dock levelers, or automatic dockboards, are devices that automatically or semi-automatically bridge the gap between a truck and a dock so that forklift trucks

can safely pass over that gap during the loading and unloading process. Dock levelers, in general, have replaced the loose plates that were often used when loading and unloading was done manually.

9. For years, dock leveler users and manufacturers as well as regulatory agencies recognized that a safety hazard existed because of the way that large trucks and trailers, for a variety of reasons, inadvertently separated from the dock during the loading or unloading process. If this happens a forklift can fall through the gap between the truck and dock onto the driveway, and the results for the forklift truck and its operator can be catastrophic.

10. For instance, the forklift truck will almost always drop to the pavement if, when the truck pulls away, the forklift is parked in a position where it is supported in part by the dockboard and in part by the truck. In this situation, there is nothing at all to keep the forklift and its operator from falling through the gap between the truck and the dock.

11. The forklift truck will also be exposed to this type of accident if it is moving either into or out of the truck or trailer at the time the truck separates from the dock. In such situations, the driver may not notice the gap and drive the forklift off the truck bed, especially if he is backing up out of the truck. Another hazard exists from sudden accelerations and decelerations of a loaded forklift inside a truck. In this situation, a considerable force tending to push the truck away from the dock can produce disaster. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to by Kelley and Rite-Hite as "trailer creep."

12. Aware of these life-threatening problems, but lacking a real solution in the late 1960's and early 1970's, Rite-Hite provided its only answer at that time, its Total Dock Safety (T.D.S.) Package (PTX-3), which included wheel chocks, a large warning sign, and a "Dock Safety Rules" sign. But these were not an adequate remedy for 2, lines 40-43].

exhibits as "PTX \_\_\_\_"

1. References to plaintiffs' trial exhibits will be identified as "PTX \_\_\_\_" and defendant's trial

driver can suffer severe or fatal injuries even if, when the truck inadvertently separates from the dock, the forklift is parked in a stationary position on the dockboard and is fully supported by the dockboard. This is because, in normal operation, the outward or free end of the dockboard rests on the bed of the truck. When the vehicle pulls away, the end of the dockboard lip that was supported by the truck tends to drop. This, in turn, tends to tip the whole dockboard downwards and pitch the forklift, its operator, and/or its load onto the driveway.

14. To eliminate this latter hazard, dock leveler manufacturers many years ago designed safety devices into their dock levelers to limit the extent to which the dockboard could tip downwards in the event of the inadvertent separation of the truck from the dock. Kelley developed its "Panic Stop," which was patented in the middle 1960's (DTX-183-8). This device had a ratchet that was engaged to prevent the outward end of the dockboard from moving downward if the dockboard started to move down abnormally fast. This prevented the further downward progress of the board. Rite-Hite also developed its patented "Safety Legs" in the early 1970's which, when not needed, could be pulled away, but when in normal operation, limited the extent to which the dockboard would descend in this situation. Neither of these devices provided a complete solution to the problem, but they clearly recognized the very real hazard and need. In its 1966 patent (DTX-183-8), Kelley acknowledged that dock accidents could result in death and added that the problem of accidental dropping of the ramp "has been a thorn in the side of mechanical dockboards for as long as such boards have been made" (DTX-183-8, col.

15. The question of whether the dock-board safety devices described above could be sold as "options" or whether they should always be made mandatory features on all dock levelers was the subject of disputes between dock equipment manufacturers. Rite-Hite sold its devices as standard equipment. Kelley's devices were sold as options.

16. A meeting of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Safety Committee MH14 was held in October 1975 to consider, among other things, this question of whether "safety legs" on dock levelers should be options or standard. During the course of this meeting, Rite-Hite's founder and representative at the meeting, Arthur K. White, became convinced that these safety stop devices then being offered were an approach to only part of the problem. He concluded that what was really needed was something to restrain the vehicle physically so that it could never move away from the dock inadvertently. No effective device was offered on the market at that time. Wheel chocks were ineffective. Warning and "communication" systems were likewise ineffective.

#### D. The Development of Vehicle Restraints at Rite-Hite

17. The '847 patent claims one of a series of basic inventions that Rite-Hite made during a product development program that lasted for a number of years. After Rite-Hite introduced its commercial Dok-Lok vehicle restraints, the rest of the industry, including Kelley, were skeptics or copyists.

18. Rite-Hite's development program was long and arduous. Rite-Hite's first vehicle restraint, which was developed by 1977 but never marketed, involved a mechanism mounted on a driveway in front of a loading dock. The "engaging mechanism" was disposed at an angle relative to the driveway and engaged a part of the truck. Another device developed shortly thereafter consisted of a pipe clamp type of latch which held a flexible steel cable and industrial hook that could be attached to

any holes or crevices in the trailer to hold it in place (PTX-16). The next effort involved a flexible cable and hydraulic holding device (PTX-124). Both of these devices were mounted on the dock platform. These devices all performed the same function that they were designed to perform, i.e., they prevented the truck from inadvertently separating from the dock. Rite-Hite filed a patent application in October of 1977 for the Hydraulic Securing Device (flexible cable) that ultimately issued as U.S. Patent 4,146,888 on March 27, 1979 (PTX-1b). A physical example of this device was demonstrated at the trial (PTX-16).

19. But these early vehicle restraints had drawbacks. They were relatively expensive, and they were relatively difficult to use. They were also obtrusive and vulnerable to damage because of their location either on the driveway, where they could be hit by trucks or snowplows, or on the top surface of the loading dock, where they could obstruct traffic or be vulnerable to forklift trucks moving about the dock.

20. By the spring of 1978, Rite-Hite had developed a vehicle restraint mounted on the vertical face of the dock where it was less of an obstruction and less likely to be damaged. This device included a "pivoted hook" member. The hook had a shank pivoted to the wall and a right angle hook to engage a vehicle. The hook member, when not used, was stored in a downwardly rotated position with the shank pendent along the wall. As the pivoted hook members refined over several generations, the hook was operable either manually (by a driver standing on the driveway) or automatically (with the power of an activated clock lever). When used, it was pivoted upwardly to an operative mode to engage the truck via the truck's ICC bar. This device represented a major advance in the art of vehicle restraints. Accordingly, Rite-Hite filed a patent application which issued as U.S. Patent 4,208,161 (PTX-1d). Physical exhibits of these devices were also demonstrated at the trial (PTX-17 and PTX-18).

21. But these devices with a pivoted hook also had drawbacks. The main drawback was the fact that they were limited in terms of the variations in ICC bars that could be accommodated. ICC bars are bars that the Interstate Commerce Commission requires on most trucks to prevent low automobiles from running underneath them in the event of rear-end collisions. To learn about the variations in ICC bars, Rite-Hite conducted surveys of thousands of trailers and obtained data from trailer manufacturers. These surveys indicated that ICC bars were present on all over-the-road trailers and also provided Rite-Hite with extensive knowledge about the differences that existed between the various ICC bars in terms of shape and height from the ground. Rite-Hite found that the ICC bar height varied, as much as 15 inches from the legal maximum of 30 inches above the ground, and this variation presented serious problems for Rite-Hite's early pre-1978 inventive efforts. The surveys also showed that "over-the-road" trailers had a suspension "float" of 2 inches to 2½ inches. Float was accommodated in one of the earlier generations (PTX-18) by permitting the hook to rotate against the resistance of a spring.

E. U.S. Patent 4,972,847

22. By late 1978, an adjustable trapezoidal carriage was developed and added, and the pivoted hook was then mounted in the carriage. The carriage was biased upward with springs stored in the dock lever to hold the carriage with the enclosed hook above the ground when it was not in operation. The carriage was actuated by movement of the ICC bar so that the carriage moved down against the springs as the truck backed into the dock. The downward movement of the carriage positioned the hook so that it was always in a good position to be activated and pivoted up to engage the ICC bar. With this device, Rite-Hite found it could accommodate the vast bulk of the ICC-bars which its research had indicated would be encountered. The carriage also accommodated "float." This device was another substantial advancement in the art of restraining trucks, and Rite-Hite filed a patent application resulting in

23. In 1979, Rite-Hite developed some improvements which further refined this "pivoted hook" restraint. Among other things, the springs are incorporated into opposite sides of the trapezoidal carriage along which the carriage slides so that the restraint can operate independently of any dock lever, and rotation of the hook was motorized. It is this version of a restraint with a pivoted hook that was ultimately commercialized in the spring of 1980 as the Model ADL-100 Dok-Lok vehicle restraint. U.S. Patent 4,264,259 (the '259 Patent) (PTX-6), disclosing and claiming this device, issued on April 28, 1981. This device was also demonstrated at trial (PTX-131).

24. Rite-Hite's development program continued after the introduction of the Model ADL-100. One of the program's objectives was cost reduction and simplification. In order to achieve that objective, a vehicle restraint that was simple, more rugged and inexpensive, and that could be manually operated, if desired, was sought.

25. In the spring of 1981, about a year after the introduction of the ADL-100, Steven Hipp and Norbert Hahn developed the first of Rite-Hite's MDL vehicle restraints. This is the system of the '847 patent and the Kelley Truk Stop. The '847 patent is entitled RELEASABLE LOCKING DEVICE, was filed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on May 4, 1981, and is issued on February 15, 1983.

26. The '847 patent is directed to a new approach to a vehicle locking device or vehicle restraint for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent stationary upright structure such as a dockwall. The device of the '847 patent has a frame vertically extending up the dockwall and secured to the exposed surface of the wall. It has a hook assembly that has a follower mounted in the frame for vertical movement between an upper operative position, where it will se-

cure the vehicle against the wall, and a lower inoperative position free of the vehicle so that the vehicle can be driven away from the wall. The hook assembly has a horizontal shank portion extending outwardly from the follower and a vertical hook portion. The device of the '847 patent further has a retaining means to retain the hook in its upper operative position but to selectively permit the hook to be released to its lower inoperative position.

27. In addition to the above-described basic structure, the device of the '847 patent includes a slide as a part of the fixed wall-mounted frame, which is urged upwardly by a biasing force and has a first part of the retaining means secured to it. A coacting complimentary second part of the retaining means is carried by the hook and engages the first part to prevent accidental movement of the hook from an operative to an inoperative position. Thereby, any loading of the vehicle, such as upon the entry of a forklift truck, will cause the hook, the slide, and the two parts of the retaining slide, to move together downwardly against the biasing force of the spring to provide downward float. This is a desirable feature, for without it, the device could become "jammed" by the weight of the truck pushing down on the hook assembly engaged with the ICC bar. This downward float is made possible by heavy duty springs which hold the slide so that the slide and the first part of the retaining means are upwardly biased even when no restraining a vehicle. As a result, the retaining means and the hook element can move, as a unit, several inches vertically downward when subjected to the forces of a truck being loaded.

28. While, in the preferred embodiment described in the '847 patent, the first part of the retaining means is a ratchet and the second part is a pawl, the description in column 2 starting at line 2 makes it very clear that the patent is not limited to this particular embodiment. At column 3, line 5, the description makes it clear that other equivalent devices, and in particular elongated vertically extending devices, could be employed instead of a ratchet. At column

4, lines 9-10, the description makes it equally clear that other equivalent devices could be substituted for the pawl. From the testimony of both experts, the Patent Office prosecution history, and the other evidence, it is clear that the rack and pinion of Kelly and the threaded shaft of the Taylor, et al., reference, cited by the Examiner, are the equivalent of the ratchet and pawl shown in the particular embodiment described in the '847 patent.

#### F. The '847 Patent Was Commercialized As the MDL-55

31. Rite-Hite had successfully tested production prototypes, was completing production drawings and obtaining quotes on large production quantities of parts when Messrs. Hip, Hahn, and Sweeney in mid-1981 came up with an improved version, the MDL-55. Although the basic device shown in the '847 patent had downward float, this unit did not have what people in the industry today call "upward" float, i.e., the hook is not initially springbiased up against the ICC bar. At the trial, the evidence established that normal "over-the-road" trucks deflect between about 1 inch and 2½ inches, so that in most situations, the vertical hook portion of the hook assembly shown in the '847 patent would accommodate the upward float of the ICC bars. The vertical hook portion of the hook assembly could also, of course, have been made longer to provide additional compensation for the "upward float" of the ICC bar.

32. With the improvement of the MDL-55, if the ICC bar rises as weight is taken off the truck, an initial bias is provided that can raise the vertically movable hook. This increased the versatility of the vertically moving hook. The improved restraint handles not only "over-the-road" trailers but "city" trucks (a small percentage of the vehicles to be restrained), which generally have weaker springs and, thus, deflect more than the "over-the-road" trailers. This improved MDL device, the Model MDL-55 vehicle restraint, is disclosed and claimed in U.S. Patent 4,443,150 (PTX-1).

chance of interference with things other than the ICC bar. In addition, the pivoting hook has a tendency to rotate away, whereas there is no such concern with the vertically moving hook assembly. Mr. Erlandsen made these observations at his deposition and continued to acknowledge these advantages at the trial. In addition, the Model MDL can be used either with or without a power source.

34. Similarly, the Kelley Truk Stop uses

the '847 patent, but by using a motor and rack and pinion instead of the ratchet and pawl of the specific embodiment of the '847 patent, Kelley obtains the same advantages as the MDL-55's initial upward float. Kelley's Truk Stop is additional evidence of the commercial success of the invention of the '847 patent. While one can never be certain of the precise causal relationship of commercial success, nevertheless in this case, it appears from all of the evidence that the invention of the '847 patent was a very significant factor.

#### G. Kelley's Development of Its "Truk Stop" Device

35. The facts established at trial indicate that Kelley learned about and made its vertically moving hook through its examination and adoption of the Rite-Hite MDL-55 device and the related literature.

36. Kelley's imitation of the vertically moving hook and the other elements of the '847 patent is indicative of the value, the importance, and the unobviousness of the invention claimed in the '847 patent. Furthermore, the fact that Kelley has procured U.S. Patent 4,488,325 (DTX-212), on aspects of its vehicle restraint, does not negate the infringement of Rite-Hite's '847 patent. The very foundation of the patent system contemplates that users of a basic patent will make improvements with time. Both Kelley and Rite-Hite did so here, but if anything, that enhances the dignity of the '847 patent.

37. Kelley's first knowledge of a workable vehicle restraint came with the introduction of the ADL-100 Dok-Lok sold by Rite-Hite in April of 1980. In June of 1980, Kelley's response to this first device of

Rite-Hite was to propose various communications devices (PTX-64). One year later, in June of 1981, Kelley was still working on communicationstype devices (PTX-65).

38. In the late summer of 1981, about the time of the introduction of Rite-Hite's Model MDL-55, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued an instruction (PTX-30), the purpose of which was to allow the use of vehicle restraints without wheel chocks.

39. At about this same time, Kelley's sales representatives began expressing increased concerns to Kelley (which was still without a vehicle restraint in its product line) that sales of Rite-Hite's vehicle restraints could be coupled with sales of Rite-Hite dock levelers which would otherwise be sold by Kelley (PTX-36). This was a double injury in the market place. As a result, the representatives found that their ability to sell dock equipment was hampered by the presence of Rite-Hite's vehicle restraints.

40. Kelley had no plans for a physical restraint at the time of the OSHA instruction. Rather, Kelley's focus was still on communication. Knowing of the longstanding problem, Kelley had failed to recognize the solution.

41. On Friday, November 13, 1981, John Hogseth (Kelley's Vice President of Marketing) sent a memo to Joseph Driear (Kelley's Director of Engineering) formally requesting Mr. Driear to begin work immediately on a vehicle restraint to "compete against the Rite-Hite Dok-Lok and to cost less than \$1,000" (PTX-32). During the course of this program, Kelley personnel referred to its vehicle restraint as "Kelley's version of the Dok-Lok" (PTX-36).

42. On the following Monday, November 16, 1981, Hogseth's memo (PTX-32) was marked "received" by "Engineering," and a memo at the bottom in Mr. Driear's handwriting of the same date indicates that Mr. Driear would comply with Mr. Hogseth's requests but that the following were initially required:

(a) Engineering needed a copy of the OSHA regulations that sanction the use

of vehicle restraints (this was done four days later as noted below);

(b) The formal "request" for the product development program should be submitted (there is evidence that this was, apparently, never done);

(c) A copy of the "complete" Rite-Hite literature should be sent to Engineering (the operating instruction sheet for the MDL-55 had been received by Engineering on September 17, 1981, as an attachment to a memorandum from Hogseth (PTX-31), but other literature, such as an ADL-100 booklet, was not provided until later); and

(d) A sample of the Rite-Hite product should be made available to Engineering (this was done on December 30, 1981, as described below).

43. On the next day, Mr. Driear carefully reviewed copies of certain Rite-Hite patents, including the patent claiming the Model ADL-100 restraint (with a pivoting hook), and made notes regarding the claims of the patents (PTX-33). His notes all portray, among other things, the "pivoted hook" configuration shown in the Rite-Hite patent.

44. About that time, Kelley's patent attorney, Glenn Starke, visited Mr. Driear, and they discussed the Rite-Hite patents. Although the Model MDL-55 devices were marked "patent pending" (PTX-93), no search or study was made or opinion given on what patents might issue on the MDL-55.

45. Also, at about this time, the vehicle restraint development project of Kelley was assigned the project number "915" and was assigned to David Bennett, a young engineer working under Mr. Driear's supervision. Mr. Bennett is now deceased. Kelley continued to work on communications-type systems (PTX-65).

46. A date stamp on the OSHA instruction indicates that it was received by Kelley's engineering department on Friday, November 20, 1981 (PTX-30).

47. On December 29, 1981, Mr. Bennett wrote a memo in longhand setting forth the

duction to the representatives and production, shortly after the date projected by Kelley in the fall of 1981 (PTX-32).

55. The evidence at trial, both through the testimony of Kelley's personnel and its documentation, shows that Kelley had given a great deal of thought to the question of a product that would compete with Rite-Hite's vehicle restraint, and that Kelley had made little progress in its own efforts to come up with a competing device until after its engineers had the benefit of the MDL-55 Dok-Lok brochures and inspected, tested, and dismantled an actual MDL-55.

56. The testimony at trial of Robert Englekirk, a Kelley sales representative in Minneapolis in 1981 and 1982, was uncontested. That evidence showed the commercial impact of the Rite-Hite Dok-Lok restraints, the need for such device, and the response of Kelley. Mr. Kuhns, President of Kelley, during a private showing of the new Truk Stop in the spring of 1982, demonstrated it side by side with Rite-Hite MDL-55 and explained the relationship between them to Mr. Englekirk.

#### H. Kelley Has Failed to Prove That the '847 Patent Is Invalid

57. Kelley has asserted invalidity of the claims in suit of the '847 patent, stating that the claimed combination is obvious and shown in the prior art. The Court finds that Kelley has failed to carry forth its burden that the patent is invalid and holds that the claims in suit are not invalid.

##### a. The Claimed Invention Is Nonobvious.

58. Kelley has alleged that the asserted claims are obvious over the prior art. On this issue the Court has (1) determined the scope and content of the prior art, (2) ascertained the difference between the prior art and subject matter claim, (3) determined the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) given consideration to the objective evidence of nonobviousness such as long-felt need, commercial success, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results. Based upon the evidence coupled with an analysis

of this indicia, the Court finds that the subject matter of claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12 and 13 are nonobvious.

59. Kelley set forth a number of prior art references during the trial. Many of these references were before the Examiner and some of them were not. With respect to the references not before the Examiner, the Court finds that none of these are more pertinent than the art before the Examiner. Along these lines, the Court rejects Mr. Erlansson's testimony that U.S. Patent 4,282,821 (PTX-1g), which issued to Anthony, et al., for a Releasable Locking Device and which was not before the Examiner, is more pertinent than U.S. Patent 4,264,259 (PTX-1e), issued to Mr. Hipp for a Releasable Locking Device; U.S. Patent 4,267,748 (PTX-1f), issued to Grunewald, et al., for a Releasable Locking Mechanism; and U.S. Patent 4,208,161 (PTX-1d), issued to Mr. Hipp, et al., for Device For Releasably Securing A Vehicle To An Adjacent Support, all of which were cited by the Examiner. All of these patents, discussed earlier, resulted from the Rite-Hite vehicle restraint program. The '621 patent teaches no more than the '259, '748, or '161 patents, which were before the Examiner.

60. The plethora of references set forth by Kelley in general fall into two categories. The first category contains ratchet and pawl references shown in a montage (DTX-202). The reliance on these references is based upon Kelley's misapprehension of the claims as being specific to a ratchet and pawl as an element of the claimed combination. None of the claims is limited to a ratchet and pawl, and Rite-Hite never contended it had invented a ratchet and pawl. Kelley put in no evidence that any of the ratchet and pawl references suggested use of that element in the claimed combination to secure a parked vehicle against a stationary upright structure such as a dock wall. Thus, none of the prior art items in DTX-202 is of significance in the issue of obviousness.

61. The second category of prior art is that shown in DTX-201. These references all relate to some type of vehicle restraint,

but none shows the claimed combination of the '847 patent. The closest references to the asserted '847 patent claims are the work of Rite-Hite's development team.

None of those references suggest going to the system of the '847 claims with a horizontal hook shank mounted to a follower to a vertical support or with a biased slide and retaining means for the vertically movable hook. Nor do those references suggest a slide, a vertically movable hook in the slide and retaining means to support the hook fixed in the slide, all vertically movable as a unit to provide float.

62. The examiner had the best of these references before him; that is, Rite-Hite's '259, '161, and '748 patents showing pivotally mounted hooks on a vertical wall. The Examiner was correct in finding the '847 claims unobvious and patentable thereover. While each single element of the claims may have precedent in the prior art, as is true in most mechanical patents, the combination of elements set forth in the claims of the '847 patent asserted here was novel. It proved a workable, efficient, and inexpensive solution to a very long-felt need in the dock equipment industry and was not suggested in any reference. Kelley was well aware of the serious safety hazard, including injuries and even deaths, from inadvertent and accidental withdrawals of trucks from loading docks and the need for a practical solution since at least as early as 1966 when they sought patent protection on what they called the Panic Stop (PTX-183-8).

63. There was some disagreement between the parties at the trial about the level of ordinary skill in the art in the early 1980's. The Court adopts the definition of plaintiff's technical expert witness Professor John Sursit who stated that the level of skill is relatively low, and that a person with several years of design experience in the steel and machinery art would typify the ordinary skill. A few of the workers in the art, usually managers, might have an engineering degree. With this definition, the Court finds that the claimed combination would not have been obvious to one

skilled in the art at the time of the invention.

64. Even if this Court adopts Kelley's definition of the higher level of skill (a qualified engineer) suggested by Kelley's expert witness, Mr. Erlansson, this Court finds that this invention would have been nonobvious.

65. This finding of nonobviousness is further supported in light of the objective evidence of unobviousness. For example, the '847 patent provided a solution to the long-felt need that escaped the industry, including Kelley, until after Hipp and Hahn made the invention and Rite-Hite began to sell the invention of the '847 patent as the Model MDL-55 vehicle restraint. Before that time, Kelley concentrated its efforts on communications devices and not physical restraints, and even when charged with coming up with physical restraints, it was unable to do so.

66. A further indicium of nonobviousness is copying or imitation by competitors. In this case, Kelley was not able to come up with a solution or a construction for a physical restraint on its own prior to receiving the Rite-Hite MDL-55 literature in the late summer of 1981 and having the MDL-55 installed on the dock of its Tuf-Seal subsidiary on December 30, 1981. Kelley's officers and engineers, within hours after the Rite-Hite installation was completed at Tuf-Seal, were inspecting, operating, photographing, disassembling, and measuring the Rite-Hite MDL-55. Within a few weeks thereafter, the Kelley documentary records show the first evidence of the development of the truck restraint that became the Truk Stop, including a witnessed drawing (PTX 57) and other subsequent indications of the construction of the first prototype, which was made in February of 1982 (PTX 43). Such evidence further supports the argument of unobviousness.

67. As mentioned earlier, while it is never possible to relate commercial success to one specific cause, the invention encompassed by the '847 patent is one significant cause that has resulted in the commercial success of both the MDL-55 of Rite-Hite and the Kelley Truk Stop.

68. Kelley claims that the commercial Rite-Hite product, the MDL-55, also incorporates an improvement over the basic disclosure of the '847 patent. It is, of course, axiomatic in the patent law that one cannot avoid infringement of a basic patent, such as the '847 patent, by making certain improvements on the basic structure, such as the addition of a motor drive or means for providing increased float as compared to the structure of the '847 patent. Similarly, the fact that Rite-Hite's commercial product represents an improvement that came after the basic invention of the '847 patent in no way detracts from the commercial success of the patented structure.

*b. Kelley Has Failed to Prove Anticipation*

69. Kelley has also alleged that the asserted claims are shown by the prior art, although its evidence was vague on whether it alleged an anticipation under any section of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The Court finds that Kelley has failed to carry forth its burden on this allegation.

*C. CLAIM 1*

A releasable locking device for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent relatively stationary upright structure, said device comprising:

- (a) a first means mountable on an exposed surface of the structure,
- (b) a second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes,
- (c) the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an operative mode and in a non-contacting relation with the vehicle,
- (d) and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode,
- (e) said second means including a first section projecting outwardly from said first means, one end of said first section being connected to said first means and being guided thereby for selective relative movement in a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second sec-

*1. Kelley's Infringement of the '847 Patent*

- 71. Infringement of Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of the '847 patent by the Kelley

vehicle restraint marketed under the trade mark "Truk Stop" was proven at trial. To facilitate reading these claims, they were broken down at trial and compared with features and elements of the Kelley device. Rite-Hite's technical expert witness, Professor Strait, explained the relationship at the trial with the assistance of colored charts of the '847 patent drawings (PTX-10) and Kelley's device (PTX-14) as well as demonstrations of various models. In particular, Professor Strait showed how the asserted claims of the '847 patent read on the drawings of the '847 patent (PTX-10 and PTX-10-A), the Model MDL (PTX-19), and the Model MDL-55 (PTX-123) (the improved Model MDL, which has met with commercial success in the marketplace through sales of over 1,800 units), and Kelley's Truk Stop device (PTX-21).

72. Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of the '847 patent, as asserted against Kelley's product, in the form as relied upon by the plaintiffs at trial in PTX 11, 12, and 13, are as follows:

*C. CLAIM 1*

A releasable locking device for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent relatively stationary upright structure, said device comprising:

- (a) a first means mountable on an exposed surface of the structure,
- (b) a second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes,
- (c) the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an operative mode,
- (d) and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode,
- (e) said second means including a first section projecting outwardly from said first means, one end of said first section being connected to said first means and being guided thereby for selective relative movement in a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second sec-

*1. Kelley's Infringement of the '847 Patent*

- 71. Infringement of Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of the '847 patent by the Kelley

end of said first section being mounted on said first means for selective independent movement relative thereto along a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second section extending angularly upwardly from said first section and being spaced outwardly a substantially fixed distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the structure,

(f) said second means, when in an operative mode, being adapted to interlocking engage a portion of the parked vehicle disposed intermediate to second section and said first means,

(g) said second means, when in an inoperative mode, being adapted to be in a lowered nonlocking relation with the parked vehicle.

*C. CLAIM 2*

The device of claim 1 wherein (a) the first means includes a first member fixedly mountable on the structure and a second member mounted on said first member for limited substantially vertical relative movement, said second member being upwardly biased to assume a normal rest position,

(b) second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes,

(c) the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an operative mode,

(d) and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode,

(e) said third means having a first element carried by the second member of said first means, and a complementary second element carried by said second means, said first and second elements coacting with one another to prevent movement of said second means from an operative mode to an inoperative mode,

(f) said second means including a first section projecting outwardly from said first means, one end of said first section being connected to said first means and being guided thereby for selective relative movement in a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second sec-

*C. CLAIM 3*

The device of claim 2 wherein (a) the third means includes a first element coacting with a complementary second element carried by said second means of said first means to prevent movement of said second means from an operative mode to an inoperative mode.

on said first means for selective independent movement relative thereto along a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second section extending angularly upwardly from said first section and being spaced outwardly a substantially fixed distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the structure,

(a) the first means includes elongated upright guide means,

(b) and the first section of the second means includes guide-engaging elements carried on the one end of said first section and continuously maintaining said first section in an outwardly projecting relation with respect to said first means,

(c) A releasable locking device for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent upright structure, said device comprising a first member fixedly mountable on the structure and a second member mounted on said first member for limited substantially vertical relative movement, said second member being upwardly biased to assume a normal rest position,

(d) second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes,

(e) the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an operative mode,

(f) and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode,

(g) said third means including a first section projecting outwardly from said first means, one end of said first section being connected to said first means and being guided thereby for selective relative movement in a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second sec-

tion extending angularly upwardly from said first section and being spaced outwardly from said first means, (g) said second means, when in an operative mode, being adapted to interlocking-ly engage a portion of the parked vehicle disposed intermediate the second section and said first means, (h) said second means, when in an inoperative mode, being adapted to be in a nonlocking relation with the parked vehicle,

(i) the second member of said first means being movable downwardly from the normal rest position only when a depressive external force exerted on said second means, while the latter is retained in an operative mode, exceeds the biasing force applied to said second member.

73. Upon hearing all of the evidence presented at the trial, including the expert testimony of both Professor Strait (Rite-Hite's technical expert) and Mr. Erlandson (Kelley's Vice President of Engineering and its technical expert), the Court finds that Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of the '847 patent are infringed by Kelley's device.

74. In particular, Professor Strait showed that the Kelley device, which is directed to a releasable locking device or vehicle restraint for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent upright structure, such as a dockwall, has a frame vertically extending up the dockwall and secured to the exposed surface of the wall, a hook assembly slidably mounted in that frame for vertical movement between an upper operative position where it will secure the vehicle

against the wall and a lower inoperative position free of the vehicle so that the vehicle can be driven away from the wall. The hook assembly of the Kelley device also has a horizontal shank portion, a vertical hook portion, and a follower that moves in the frame between the upper operative and lower inoperative positions. The Kelley device also has a means in the form of a rack and pinion which operates with a reversible motor to retain the hook in its upper operative position but to selectively permit the hook to be released to its inoperative position.

75. In addition, at the trial Professor Strait showed that the Truk Stop unit also includes a slide as a part of the fixed frame, which is urged upwardly by a biasing force in the form of a gas spring and has one part of the locking means, namely, the rack secured to it. A coacting complementary part of the retaining means, the pinion, is carried by the hook and engaged with the rack to prevent accidental movement of the rack to an operative mode as the hook from an operative to an inoperative position. As a result, the Truk Stop will move downward when subject to the force of a truck being loaded providing downward "float." Upward float can also be accommodated by the Truk Stop unit. When the ICC bar moves upward, the motor is activated and the hook moves up with the ICC bar.

76. During Mr. Erlandson's cross-examination, the following chart (PTX-136) was developed with respect to Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, and 12:

| CLAIM PART     | KELLEY COLOR | RITE-HITE COLOR | '847 PATENT   | TRUK STOP     |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| FIRST MEANS    |              |                 |               |               |
| First Member   | Light Blue   | Brown           | Frame         | Frame         |
| Second Member  | Dark Blue    | Orange          | Slide         | Slide         |
| SECOND MEANS   | Yellow       | Yellow          | Hook Assembly | Hook Assembly |
| THIRD MEANS    |              |                 |               |               |
| First Element  | Dark Red     | Green           | Pawl          | Pinion & Worm |
| Second Element | Light Red    | Purple          | Ratchet       | Rack          |
| BLASING FORCE  | Orange       | Blue            | Spring        | Spring        |

This chart shows the direct correlation of the '847 patent claim elements and the Truk Stop elements.

77. The Truk Stop device also has a reversible motor that is part of the retaining means. Kelley argued at the trial that its use of a rack and pinion, where the pinion is "driven" up the rack by a motor, avoids infringement of the asserted claims because the third means for releasably retaining the hook in an operative mode as recited in the claims did not cover the Kelley device. Kelley argued further that because a secondary objective of the Rite-Hite patent is to provide a device that does not require an electrical power source to operate, the claims are thereby limited to manual devices. The Court does not find either of Kelley's arguments persuasive.

78. First, the broader claims that are asserted here are not, in any way, limited to a ratchet and pawl. In fact, "means plus function" language is used which is directed to a desired result, i.e., "third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode." During the trial, Kelley's expert witness continued to apply the doctrine of equivalents test with

respect to interpreting means plus function language. This is not the proper test. Rather, to interpret these functional claims, reference must be made to the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. That paragraph states that the patentee is entitled to a claim covering the means described in the specification and equivalents that perform the stated function. The rack and pinion is interchangeable with a ratchet and pawl and is the clear equivalent of a ratchet and pawl for releasably retaining the hook in its operative position. *Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.*, 762 F.2d 959, 976 (Fed.Cir.1985). To hold otherwise would nullify § 112. *D.M.I. Inc. v. Deere & Co.*, 755 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1985).

79. This finding, with respect to the scope of the "means plus function" language, is buttressed by the fact that other claims in the '847 patent, which are not asserted here, specifically recite a ratchet and pawl. To limit the broader claims, in the way Kelley asked this Court to do, would go against a rational construction of the claims.

80. Furthermore, the claims are not limited to a manual device because only one of

many objectives set forth in the specification is to provide a device that is free of an electrical source. Nonasserted claims specifically recite manual operation, and thus such a limitation cannot be read into the asserted claims.

81. Even without literal infringement, the Court finds that Kelley's device infringes the asserted claims under the doctrine of equivalents. This is so because the Kelley device performs the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed subject matter of the '847 patent.

82. At the time Kelley undertook the development of its truck restraint, it requested its patent counsel to make a search of all Rite-Hite patents dealing with truck restraints, and Kelley received a written opinion from counsel that all of the Rite-Hite patents then issued were limited to a pivoting hook. Based on this opinion, Kelley proceeded to develop a truck restraint that did not use a pivoting hook in order to avoid conflict with the Rite-Hite patents. The '847 patent did not issue until almost a year after Kelley began to market its Truk Stop truck restraint. Kelley never made an infringement search beyond the six patent numbers that Kelley found listed on the Rite-Hite device's serial number tags. Nor did Kelley ever cause its counsel to make an infringement search to determine what patents might exist or might be infringed by its Truk Stop restraint. Furthermore, Kelley never obtained an opinion from its counsel on the probability or possibility of patents issuing on the MDL-55.

J. *The Unfair Competition Claims and Counterclaims*

83. On March 16, 1984, the Court preliminarily enjoined Kelley from using its Truk Stop promotional motion picture, that motion picture having been found to be misleading in its depiction of Kelley's and Rite-Hite's truck restraining devices.

84. Based on the testimony of Robert Kuhns that Kelley has taken the original motion picture off the market, has replaced it with a film loop which is acceptable to

#### M. Nonobviousness

85. At trial, the parties introduced evidence on their respective claims and counterclaims of unfair competition against each other. This evidence failed to establish any need for other injunctive relief or money damages on the part of either party.

### II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

#### K. Source of Applicable Law

86. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and venue is proper. The law applicable here is that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. South. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369, 215 U.S.P.Q. 657 (Fed.Cir.1982).

#### L. Validity of Patents

87. Section 282 of the United States patent laws (35 U.S.C. § 282) explicitly states that a patent shall be presumed valid, and this presumption attaches to each claim independently of the other claims. Jones v. Hardys, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528, 220 U.S.P.Q. 1021, 1024 (Fed.Cir.1984). Moreover, this presumption encompasses presumptions of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility—each of which are presumed to be present.

Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 714, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1264, 1269 (Fed.Cir.1984). This statutory presumption of validity places the burden of proving facts establishing invalidity by clear and convincing evidence on the party asserting invalidity. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 886, 894, 221 U.S.P.Q. 669, 674 (Fed.Cir. 1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 120 (1984).

88. It is a condition of patentability that the invention be "nonobvious," 35 U.S.C. § 103. The statutory presumption of patentability carries with it a presumption of nonobviousness. *Structural Rubber Products Co.*, 749 F.2d at 714.

In *Graham v. John Deere & Co.*,

383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693-94, 15 L.Ed.2d 545, 148 U.S.P.Q. 469, 467 (1966), the Court mandated, in determining obviousness/nonobviousness under § 103 of the patent laws, that factual inquiries be made into: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention was made; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, e.g., long-felt needs, commercial success, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results.

*Perkin-Elmer Corp.*, 732 F.2d at 894; *Jones*, 727 F.2d at 1527, 1529-31; *Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.*, 713 F.2d 693, 695-97, 218 U.S.P.Q. 865, 867-69 (Fed.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 709, 79 L.Ed.2d 173 (1984). The invention of Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 13 of the '847 patent would not have been obvious as a whole to a person of ordinary skill in the art in the spring of 1981.

#### a. The Invention As a Whole Compared to the Prior Art

89. Section 103 requires the consideration of whether the invention would or would not have been obvious "as a whole" to one of ordinary skill in the art to which that subject matter pertains at the time the invention was made. *Perkin-Elmer Corp.*, 732 F.2d at 894; *Jones*, 727 F.2d at 1529. Failure to consider the claimed invention "as a whole" would be an error of law. *W.L. Gore & Associates Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.*, 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303, 309 (Fed.Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984). In this case, there was no real vehicle restraint art or industry when Rite-Hite introduced its first Dok-Lok restraint. The

"art" consisted of the work of Rite-Hite's development team as exemplified in Rite-Hite's earlier patents.

[2] 91. Factors that are considered in determining the level of "ordinary skill in the art" may include: (1) the educational level of one of ordinary skill; (2) the types of problems encountered in the art; (3) the prior art solution to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; and (5) the sophistication of the technology. Not all of these factors need be considered in every case, and often one or more factors may predominate or are given more weight in a particular case. *Environmental Designs*, 713 F.2d at 696-97.

92. Additionally, although it is proper to note the difference existing between the claimed invention and the prior art, because that difference may serve as one element in determining the obviousness/nonobviousness issue, it is improper merely to consider the difference as the invention. The "difference" may appear to be slight, but it can be the key to success and advancement in the art. Furthermore, it is irrelevant in determining obviousness that all or all other aspects of the claimed invention are well known, in a piecemeal manner, in the art, since virtually every patent can be described as a "combination patent" or a "combination" of old elements. *Jones*, 727 F.2d at 1528. There is absolutely no basis in the law for treating combinations of old elements differently in determining patentability. *Fromson*, 755 F.2d at 1555-56.

[3] 93. Moreover, the mere fact that the disclosures or teachings of the prior art can be retrospectively combined for purposes of evaluating the obviousness/nonobviousness issue does not make the combination obvious unless the art also suggested the desirability of the combination or the inventor's beneficial results or the advantage to be derived from combining the teachings. *Fromson*, 755 F.2d at 1556; *In re Sernaker*, 702 F.2d 989, 985-96, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1, 6-7 (Fed.Cir.1983); *In re Imperato*, 486 F.2d 585, 587, 179 U.S.P.Q. 730,

732 (CCPA 1973). There is no such suggestion in this case.

94. In *Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co.*, 730 F.2d 1452, 221 U.S.P.Q. 481 (Fed. Cir. 1984), a patent for hydraulic scrap shears was held valid and nonobvious even though it specifically stated in the specification that it disclosed and claimed a combination of features previously used in two separate prior devices. The Court explained:

(2) Did others try and fail to meet the need that the invention ultimately satisfied?

(3) Did the patented invention meet with substantial success upon its introduction to the market? *Rex Chainbelt, Inc.*, 363 F.2d at 387; *Continental Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.*, 362 F.2d 123, 124, 150 U.S.P.Q. 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1966).

(4) Did the accused infringer recognize that the invention was truly meritorious? *AMP, Inc. v. Molex Products Co.*, 329 F. Supp. 1364, 1371, 170 U.S.P.Q. 2, 7 (N.D.Ill.1971).

95. Thus, even if all the elements recited in the claims of the '847 patent were in existence at the time of the invention, the fact remains that the combination of these elements for the purpose as set forth in the claims is nowhere suggested and is a non-obvious advance in the art of vehicle restraints.

#### b. The Advance in the Art Provided by the Invention in Suit

[4] 96. The objective evidence of non-obviousness discussed by the Court in *Graham* may be the most pertinent, cogent, probative, and revealing evidence available to aid in reaching a conclusion on the obviousness/nonobviousness issue and is of substantial significance in this case. *Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.*, 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76, 222 U.S.P.Q. 744, 746-47 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985). In fact, such evidence of the objective considerations must be considered as part of all the evidence in all cases. *In re Piascicki*, 746 F.2d 1468, 1471,

223 U.S.P.Q. 785 (Fed.Cir.1984). These tests include:

(1) Did the patented invention fulfill a long-felt need in the industry to which it applied? *Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.*, 534 F.2d 89, 93, 190 U.S.P.Q. 397, 400-01 (7th Cir.1976); *Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. General Kinematics Corp.*, 363 F.2d 336, 337, 150 U.S.P.Q. 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1966).

(2) Did others try and fail to meet the need that the invention ultimately satisfied?

(3) Did the patented invention meet with substantial success upon its introduction to the market? *Rex Chainbelt, Inc.*, 363 F.2d at 387; *Continental Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.*, 362 F.2d 123, 124, 150 U.S.P.Q. 1, 2 (7th Cir.1966).

(4) Did the accused infringer recognize that the invention was truly meritorious? *AMP, Inc. v. Molex Products Co.*, 329 F. Supp. 1364, 1371, 170 U.S.P.Q. 2, 7 (N.D.Ill.1971).

97. Evidence may often establish that an invention which appeared at first blush to have been obvious was not in view of the secondary considerations. *Fromson*, '755 F.2d at 1556. When a structure such as the '847 patent goes undiscovered for years and then enjoys substantial commercial success, there is strong evidence of unobviousness.

98. One cannot escape the fact that the solutions to dock hazards by preventing vehicle separation eluded the industry for years. Rite-Hite's invention claimed in the '847 patent satisfied a long and widely-felt need, and Rite-Hite succeeded where others, including Kelley prior to copying, had failed. *Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 750 F.2d 1569, 1574-16, 121 U.S.P.Q. 161 (7th Cir.1989). Here, Kelley's failure to develop a vehicle restraint prior to having access to Rite-Hite's vehicle restraint and Kelley's adoption of the vertically moving hook and other elements claimed in the '847 patent provide additional evidence of unobviousness. *Lang*, 545 F. Supp. at 945-46. In fact, Kelley's vehicle restraint, which was identified by Kelley's personnel as "Kelley's version of the Dok-Lok" (PTX-36), was nonexistent until Kelley obtained literature relating to Rite-Hite's vehicle restraint and actually inspected, disassembled, and photographed the Rite-Hite product. *General Monitors*,

same results in a similar manner. Rite-Hite's invention, in fact, satisfied this particular need in a unique manner. That is invention. *Jones*, 727 F.2d at 1531.

99. One of the advantages of Rite-Hite's invention is that it uses a simple means to maintain the restraint in the elevated, operative position. The '847 patent discloses a ratchet and pawl as one means to retain the hook in its upper position. But none of the asserted claims recite a ratchet and pawl or even just hook retaining means. Rather, a combination of elements coating in a novel and nonobvious manner are recited. The advantage of the combination went unrecognized for years by the industry, though ratchets and pawls, as well as racks and pinion gears, were well known. This supports the nonobviousness of the patent in suit. *Jones*, 727 F.2d at 1530. If anything, Kelley's reliance on earlier devices in the vehicle industry, such as an automobile jack, as well as its own patent for its Panic Stop using ratchet and Pawl combinations, shows that no one before Rite-Hite, even with the art before him, ever thought of the combination of the '847 patent.

[5] 100. The imitation of the patented invention by an alleged infringer is strong evidence of what it thinks of the patent in suit and is persuasive of what the rest of the world ought to think. *Anderson Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 165 F. Supp. 611, 623, 119 U.S.P.Q. 236, 244 (N.D.Ill.1958), modified on other grounds 265 F.2d 755, 121 U.S.P.Q. 161 (7th Cir.1959). Here, Kelley's failure to develop a vehicle restraint prior to having access to Rite-Hite's vehicle restraint and Kelley's adoption of the vertically moving hook and other elements claimed in the '847 patent provide additional evidence of unobviousness. *Lang*, 545 F. Supp. at 945-46. In fact, Kelley's vehicle restraint, which was identified by Kelley's personnel as "Kelley's version of the Dok-Lok" (PTX-36), was nonexistent until Kelley obtained literature relating to Rite-Hite's vehicle restraint and actually inspected, disassembled, and photographed the Rite-Hite product. *General Monitors*, N. The Prior Art Does Not Show the Claimed Invention

[6,7] 102. To assert that a patent claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a party must demonstrate identity of invention. *Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, 713 F.2d 760, 771 (Fed.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1284, 79 L.Ed.2d 687 (1984). The determination that a claimed invention is "anticipated" under § 102 is a factual determination. *Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.*, 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed.Cir.1984).

[8] 103. One who seeks such a finding of anticipation must show that each and every element of the patent claim is found, as arranged in the claim, either expressly described or implicitly described under appropriate principles of inherency, in a single prior art reference, or that the claimed invention was previously known or embodied in a single prior art reference, or that the claimed invention was previously known or embodied in a single prior art device or practice. *Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH*, 730 F.2d at 1458. "Unless all of the same elements are found in exactly the same situation and united in the

same way to perform an identical function, there is no anticipation." *National Business Systems, Inc. v. AM International, Inc.*, 546 F.Supp. 340, 360 (N.D.Ill.1982), aff'd, 743 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 2345, 85 L.Ed.2d 861 (1985).

#### O. Kelley's Infringement of the '847 Patent

[9] 104. The United States patent laws state that whoever without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention within the United States during the term of the patent infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The patent owner has the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden extends to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as well as to literal infringement. *Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States*, 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed.Cir.1983).

[10,11] 105. The issue of infringement raises at least two questions: (1) what is patented; and (2) has what is patented been made, used, or sold by another. The

first is a question of law, the second is a question of fact. *SSH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade Commission*, 718 F.2d 365, 376, 218 U.S.P.Q. 678, 688 (Fed.Cir.1983); *Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc.*, 720 F.2d 1665, 1669, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1137, 1140 (Fed.Cir.1983). In this case, Rite-Hite obtained a patent claiming a vehicle restraint having a combination of elements performing recited functions. The Truk Stop device, made and sold by Kelley, infringes the asserted claims.

#### (1) "Means Plus Function" Claims

[16] 108. The independent claims in the '847 patent utilize "means plus function" language. Title 35 U.S.C. § 112 is used to interpret these functional claims and states:

An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

[Emphasis added.]

To interpret the statute as limited to a particular means set forth in the specification would be to nullify that provision of § 112. The patentee's claim covers all combinations which utilize as the stated means the structure described in the specification for performing the stated function and also all combinations that utilize any product falls literally within the claim when the words are given their proper meaning, infringement is made out, and that is the end of the inquiry. *Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.*, 339 U.S. 115, 121, 212 U.S.P.Q. 105, 111 (S.Ct. 1951).

2. In a patent infringement action, patent claims measure the invention and define the boundaries of patent protection. *Reese v. Elkhart*.

605, 607, 70 S.Ct. 854, 855-56, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1956).

[13-16] 107. The question of infringement is resolved by comparing the accused device with the claims of the patent, not with the structure described in the patent or the patentee's commercial device. *Martin v. Barber*, 765 F.2d 1664, 1667, 225 U.S.P.Q. 233, 235 (Fed.Cir.1985). The Court in *Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.*, 762 F.2d 989, 975 (Fed.Cir. May 20, 1985), recognized that a "means plus function" claim is construed "to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof" for performing the stated function. The Court in *Palumbo* added that an important factor in the determination of equivalents is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would know of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. *Palumbo*, at 977.

[17, 18] 109. In construing such a claim, a number of factors may be considered: (1) the language of the claim, (2) the patent specification, (3) the prosecution history of the patent, (4) other claims in the patent, and (5) expert testimony. Once these factors are weighed, the scope of the "means" claim may be determined, and whether the Kelley device is a § 112 equivalent of the described embodiment is a question of fact. *Polumbo*, at 975-76.

Here, looking to the prosecution history of the '847 patent, the amendments to the claims and description following the citation of the Taylor, et al., patent makes it clear that the scope of equivalents for the third means is broad.

[19] 110. In addition, Kelley cannot escape infringement by the mere fact that its Truk Stop restraint is more or less efficient than the subject matter Rite-Hite claimed, or performs additional functions or adds features or is an improvement. *Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.*, 730 F.2d 1476, 1481-82, 221 U.S.P.Q. 649, 653 (Fed.Cir. 1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 306, 83 L.Ed.2d 240, 224 U.S.P.Q. 616 (1984); *Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.*, 731 F.2d 840, 848, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657 (Fed.Cir. 306, 224 U.S.P.Q. 616 (1984); *Radio Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. Welding & Boiler Works Inc.*, 447 F.2d 517, 17 U.S.P.Q. 129 (7th Cir.1971).

structure which is the equivalent of that described structure insofar as it performs the stated function. *D.M.I., Inc. v. Decre & Co.*, 765 F.2d 1670, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1985). The Court in *Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.*, 762 F.2d 989, 975 (Fed.Cir. May 20, 1985), recognized that a "means plus function" claim is construed "to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof" for performing the stated function. The Court in *Palumbo* added that an important factor in the determination of equivalents is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would know of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. *Palumbo*, at 977.

[20] 111. Furthermore, the broader claims asserted here cannot be construed to be limited to a ratchet and pawl as the "third means," or to manual operation. This law is applicable here because Claims 5, 6, and 7 of the '847 patent, which are not asserted, recite that the third means includes a ratchet and pawl, and Claims 4 and 9 recite manual operation. These narrow claim limitations cannot be read into the broader claims to avoid infringement. *D.M.I.*, 755 F.2d at 1574.

#### b. Doctrine of Equivalents

[21, 22] 112. Kelley cannot avoid a finding of infringement by arguing that its device fails outside a literal reading of the claims of the '847 patent. Although the claims of a patent are the measure of the protected invention, the judicially created "doctrine of equivalents" adds latitude and breadth to the application of claim language in order to prevent the infringer from perpetrating "a fraud on a patent." *Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.*, 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, 856, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1930). The doctrine of equivalents is designed to protect a patentee, such as Rite-Hite, from an infringer, such as Kelley, who appropriates the invention even if the infringer avoids the literal language of the claims. As such, a finding of infringement is in order here because Kelley's device performs the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention. *Atlas Powder Co. v. Graver Tank*, 339 U.S. at 855-56. Under this doctrine, Rite-Hite's claims are infringed by Kelley's imitation even if Kelley did not precisely clone every literal detail of Rite-Hite's claimed invention.

#### a. Literal Infringement

[12] 106. If an allegedly infringing product falls literally within the claim when the words are given their proper meaning, infringement is made out, and that is the end of the inquiry. *Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.*, 339 U.S. 115, 121, 212 U.S.P.Q. 105, 111 (S.Ct. 1951).

2. In a patent infringement action, patent claims

[23, 24] 113. The range of equivalents to which a patent claim is entitled is on a sliding scale depending on the nature of the invention. *John Zink Co. v. National Aircoil Burner Co.*, 613 F.2d 567, 555, 205 U.S.P.Q. 494 (5th Cir. 1980); *Juliens v. Gomer & Andre Tractor Repairs, Inc.*, 438 F.Supp. 768, 766, 196 U.S.P.Q. 224 (M.D.La. 1977), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1979). In particular, when a patented invention has had "significant commercial success" or the patent is of the "pioneer type," the patent claims are to be construed liberally and are not to be limited to the identical means and mode of operation shown in the patent. *Graver Tank*, 339 U.S. at 608-09, 70 S.Ct. at 856; *King-Seelye Thermos Co. v. Reynolds Products, Inc.*, 322 F.Supp. 713, 720 (N.D.Ill. 1970); *Chicago Patent Corp. v. Grenco, Inc.*, 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941). The broadest protection is given to "a patent covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art." *Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 483 F.2d 858, 870, 177 U.S.P.Q. 481 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 597, 38 L.Ed.2d 485, 180 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1973). The Rite-Hite patent is a pioneer patent because it claims a vehicle restraint that functions in a novel manner, unlike any of the earlier restraints of Rite-Hite or anyone else.

[25, 26] 114. Broad protection is given not only to so-called pioneer patents, but also patents that make a substantial contribution to an existing art and patents that consist of a combination of old ingredients that produce new and useful results.

*Graver Tank*, 339 U.S. at 608, 70 S.Ct. at 856; *Juliens*, 438 F.Supp. at 766. Accord-

[27] 115. In addition, the mere use by Kelley of a component that may be more sophisticated than that disclosed in the specific embodiment of the Rite-Hite patent does not allow Kelley to escape an appropriate range of equivalents and thereby avoid infringement of the claimed invention. *Hughes Aircraft Co.*, 717 F.2d at 1385-86; *Atlas Powder Co.*, 760 F.2d at 1579-81; *Bendix Corp. v. United States*, 600 F.2d 1364, 1382, 220 Ct.Cl. 507, 204 U.S.P.Q. 617, 631 (1979).

#### P. Rite-Hite's Right to Recover Prejudgment Interest

[28] 116. In addition to the other relief recoverable for infringement of its patent, the patentee should recover prejudgment interest as provided in 35 U.S.C. § 284 in order to prevent the infringer from having the benefit of the use of the money which it would have been paying in royalties. *General Motors Corp. v. Denver Corp.*, 461 U.S. 648, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983).

#### Q. Multiplied Damages and Attorneys' Fees Are Not Warranted

#### R. Kelley's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal

[29] 117. The asserted claims of the '847 patent are not invalid and are infringed by Kelley by making and selling the Truk Stop vehicle restraint.

[30] 118. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, multiplied damages up to three times the amount found or assessed may be awarded by the Court. Kelley's activities here do not warrant such an award.

[31] 119. The activities of Kelley and the circumstances of this case are not sufficiently exceptional to prompt an award of attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

#### III. STAY OF EXECUTION

[32] 120. Kelley has moved for a stay of injunction pending appeal. The motion is technically premature because a notice of appeal has not yet been filed, but the Court has the authority to grant a stay conditioned on the movant's filing of a notice of appeal within a specified period.

Cite # 629 F.Supp. 1067 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)

[31, 32] 121. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c), the Court may in its discretion suspend a final judgment granting an injunction if the party seeking suspension of the judgment pending appeal can show: (1) that it is likely to prevail on the merits on appeal; (2) that unless a stay is granted it will suffer irreparable injury; (3) that a stay would not substantially harm other parties to the litigation; and (4) that a stay is in the public interest. *Adams v. Walker*, 488 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1973); *Decker v. U.S. Department of Labor*, 485 F.Supp. 837, 844 (E.D.Wis. 1980). A showing of absolute probability of success on the merits on appeal need not be made if the injunction would destroy the status quo, irreparably harming the appellant, and granting of the stay will cause only slight harm to the appellee. *Providence Journal Co. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 595 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1979).

#### ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant Kelley Company, Inc., its officers, employees, agents, and those in privy with them are enjoined from infringing U.S. Patent 4,373,847 by the manufacture or sale of vehicle restraints sold under the trademark Truk Stop and embodying the claimed vehicle restraint pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283, and that Kelley is liable to the plaintiffs for damages, including pre-judgment interest, as a result of its infringement.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kelley's motion for a stay of the above-described injunction pending appeal is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c), but further, this stay shall expire within thirty days of the filing date of this decision and order unless a notice of appeal is filed within that period.

No. 85-CV-293.

United States District Court,  
N.D. New York.  
March 5, 1986.

Upon a motion to dismiss § 1983 claims arising out of a state criminal case

## Appendix E



Chauvat<sup>16</sup>

discloses host-vector systems

for gene cloning in the cyanobacterium *Synechocystis* 6803, in which the antibiotic resistance-conferring *nco* gene is utilized as a selectable marker.Reiss<sup>17</sup>studies expression in *E. coli* of

various proteins formed by fusion of cer-

tain foreign DNA sequences with the *nco* gene.Kolowsky<sup>18</sup>

discloses chimeric plasmids

designed for transformation of the cyano-

bacterium *Synechococcus* R2, comprising

an antibiotic-resistant gene linked to chro-

mosomal DNA from the *Synechococcus*

cyanobacterium.

Barnes, United States Patent No. 4,695,

455, is directed to the treatment with stabi-

lizing chemical reagents of pesticides pro-

duced by expression of heterologous genes

(such as those encoding *Bacillus* proteins)in host microbial cells such as *Pseudomo-**nas* bacteria. The host cells are killed by

this treatment, but the resulting pesticidal

compositions exhibit prolonged toxic activi-

ty when exposed to the environment of

target pests.

in DNA, and then moves through the gene mak-

ing an RNA molecule that includes the informa-

tion contained in the gene. Initiation specifically

is the ability of the RNA polymerase to initiate

this process specifically at a site(s) on the DNA

template.

14. 81 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 5961 (1984).

15. 204 Mol. Gen. Genet. 185 (1986).

16. 30 Gene 211 (1984).

17. 27 Gene 289 (1984).

in transformed<sup>3</sup> cyanobacterial hosts according to the claimed invention, the presence of the insecticide in the food of the targeted insects advantageously guarantees direct uptake by the insects.

#### B. Appellants' Disclosure

In addition to describing the claimed invention in generic terms, appellants' specification discloses two particular species of *Bacillus* (*B. thuringiensis*, *B. sphaericus*) as sources of insecticidal protein; and nine genera of cyanobacteria (*Synechocystis*, *Anacystis*, *Synechococcus*, *Agmenellum*, *Aphanocystis*, *Gloecapsa*, *Nostoc*, *Anabaena* and *Flymekillia*) as useful hosts. The claims on appeal are 1-48 and 50-52, all claims remaining in the application.

The working examples relevant to the claims on appeal detail the transformation of a single strain of cyanobacteria, i.e., *Synechocystis* 6803. In one example, *Synechocystis* 6803 cells are transformed with a plasmid comprising (1) a gene encoding a particular insecticidal protein ("B.t. 8") from *Bacillus thuringiensis* var. *israelensis*, linked to (2) a particular promoter, the *P<sub>L</sub>* promoter from the bacteriophage Lambda (a virus of *E. coli*). In another example, a different promoter, i.e., the *Synechocystis* 6803 promoter for the rubisco operon, is utilized instead of the Lambda *P<sub>L</sub>* promoter.

#### C. The Prior Art

A total of eleven prior art references were cited and applied, in various combinations, against the claims on appeal.

The focus of Dzelzkalns<sup>5</sup>, the primary reference cited against all of the rejected claims, is to determine whether chloroplast promoter sequences can function in cyanobacteria. To that end Dzelzkalns discloses the expression in cyanobacteria of a chloroplastic gene comprising a chloroplast promoter which includes the chlorophyll gene of claim 1. Claim 32 recites a bacterial strain Independent claim 33 and claims 34-48 which depend therefrom recite a cyanobacterial "transformed" cyanobacteria are those that have successfully taken up the foreign *Bacillus* DNA such that the DNA information has become a permanent part of the host cyanobacteria, to be replicated as new cyanobacteria are generated.

5. In the context of the claimed invention, "selectable markers" or "marker genes" refer to antibiotic-resistance conferring DNA fragments, attached to the gene being expressed, which facilitate the selection of successfully transformed cyanobacteria.

4. "Expression" of a gene refers to the production of the protein which the gene encodes; more specifically, it is the process of transferring information from a gene (which consists of

the application on appeal includes a chimeric (i.e., hybrid) gene comprising (1) a gene derived from a bacterium of the *Bacillus* genus whose product is an insecticidal protein, united with (2) a DNA promoter effective for expressing the *Bacillus* gene in a host cyanobacterium, so as to produce the desired insecticidal protein.

The claims on appeal are 1-48 and 50-52, all claims remaining in the application.

Claim 1 reads:

1. A chimeric gene capable of being expressed in Cyanobacteria cells comprising:

(a) a DNA fragment comprising a promoter region which is effective for expression of a DNA fragment in a Cyanobacterium; and

(b) at least one DNA fragment coding for an insecticidally active protein produced by a *Bacillus* strain, or coding for an insecticidally active truncated form of the above protein or coding for a protein having substantial sequence homology to the active protein,

the DNA fragments being linked so that the gene is expressed.

Claims 2-15, which depend from claim 1, recite preferred *Bacillus* species, promoters, and selectable markers.<sup>6</sup> Independent claim 16 and claims 17-31 which depend therefrom are directed to a hybrid plasmid vector which includes the chlorophyll gene of claim 1. Claim 32 recites a bacterial strain Independent claim 33 and claims 34-48 which depend therefrom recite a cyanobac-

teria DNA via messenger RNA to ribosomes where a specific protein is made.

6. "Transformed" cyanobacteria are those that have successfully taken up the foreign *Bacillus* DNA such that the DNA information has become a permanent part of the host cyanobacteria, to be replicated as new cyanobacteria are generated.

7. Chloramphenicol is an antibiotic; CAT is an enzyme which destroys chloramphenicol and thus imparts resistance thereto.

8. 137 Biochem. and Biophys. Res. Comm. 748 (1986).

9. 33 Gene 151 (1985).

10. 189 Mol. Gen. Genet. 181 (1983).

11. 203 Mol. Gen. Genet. 505 (1986).

12. 140 J. Bacteriology 246 (1979).

13. RNA Polymerase, the enzyme responsible for making RNA from DNA, binds at specific nucleotide sequences (promoters) in front of genes

**D. The Grounds of Rejection**

1. **The § 103 Rejections**

Claims 1–6, 16–21, 33–38, 47–48 and 52 (which include all independent claims in the application) were rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon Dzelzkalns in view of Sekar I or Sekar II, and Ganesan. The examiner stated that Dzelzkalns discloses a chimeric gene capable of being highly expressed in a cyanobacterium, said gene comprising a promoter region effective for expression in a cyanobacterium operably linked to a structural gene encoding CAT. The examiner acknowledged that the chimeric gene and transformed host of Dzelzkalns differ from the claimed invention in that the former's structural gene encodes CAT rather than insecticidally active protein. However, the examiner pointed out, Sekar I, Sekar II, and Ganesan teach genes encoding insecticidally active proteins produced by *Bacillus*, and the advantages of expressing such genes in heterologous hosts to obtain larger quantities of the protein. The examiner contended that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the *Bacillus* genes taught by Sekar I, Sekar II, and Ganesan for the CAT gene in the vectors of Dzelzkalns in order to obtain high level expression of the *Bacillus* genes in the transformed cyanobacteria. The examiner further contend that it would have been obvious to use cyanobacteria as heterologous hosts for expression of the claimed genes due to the ability of cyanobacteria to serve as transformed hosts for the expression of heterologous genes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the examiner contended, the invention as a whole was *prima facie* obvious.

Additional rejections were entered against various groups of dependent claims which we need not address here. All additional rejections were made in view of Dzelzkalns in combination with Sekar I, Sekar II, and Ganesan, and further in view of other references discussed in Part C above.

The Board affirmed the § 103 rejections, basically adopting the examiner's Answer as its opinion while adding a few comments. The legal conclusion of obviousness does not require absolute certainty, the Board added, but only a reasonable expectation of success, citing *In re O'Farrell*, 853 F.2d 894, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In view of the disclosures of the prior art, the Board concluded, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by a reasonable expectation of success to make the substitution suggested by the examiner.

## 2. The § 112 Rejection

The examiner also rejected claims 1–48 and 50–51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, on the ground that the disclosure was enabling only for claims limited in accordance with the specification as filed. Citing *Manual of Patent Examining Procedure* (MPEP) provisions 706.03(n)<sup>1</sup>, and (z)<sup>2</sup> as support, the examiner took the position that undue experimentation would be required of the art worker to practice the claimed invention, in view of the unpredictability in the art, the breadth of the claims, the limited number of working examples and the limited guidance provided

546. This is because in arts such as chemistry it is not obvious from the disclosure of one species, what other species will work. *In re Dredfield*, 1940 C.D. 351; 518 O.G. 255 gives this general rule: "It is well settled that in cases involving chemicals and chemical compounds, which differ radically in their properties, it must appear in an applicant's specification either by the enumeration of a sufficient number of the members of a group or by other appropriate language, that the chemicals or chemical combinations included in the claims are capable of accomplishing the desired result."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In re Sol., 1938 C.D. 723; 497 O.G.

in the specification. With respect to unpredictability, the examiner stated that

[t]he cyanobacteria comprise a large and diverse group of photosynthetic bacteria, including large numbers of species in some 150 different genera including *Synechocystis*, *Anacystis*, *Synechococcus*, *Agmenellum*, *Nostoc*, *Anabaena*, etc. The molecular biology of these organisms has only recently become the subject of intensive investigation and this work is limited to a few genera. Therefore the level of unpredictability regarding heterologous gene expression in this large, diverse and relatively poorly studied group of prokaryotes is high....

The Board affirmed, noting that "the limited guidance in the specification, considered in light of the relatively high degree of unpredictability in this particular prior art, the Board concluded, one of ordinary skill in the art would have enabled one having ordinary skill in the art to practice the broad scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18 (CCPA 1970)."

## OPINION

### A. Obviousness

[1] We first address whether the PTO erred in rejecting the claims on appeal as *prima facie* obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103. Obviousness is a legal question which this court independently reviews, though based upon underlying factual findings which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. *In re Woodward*, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1384, 1935 (Fed.Cir.1990).

[2] Where claimed subject matter has been rejected as obvious in view of a combination of prior art references, a proper analysis under § 103 requires, *inter alia*, consideration of two factors: (1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that they should make the claimed composition or device, or carry out the claimed process; and (2) whether the prior art would also have revealed that in so making or carrying out, those of ordinary skill would have

motivated the art worker as the PTO con-

tends. As the PTO concedes, cyanobacteria and bacteria are not identical; they are classified as two separate divisions of the kingdom Procyotae.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, it is only in recent years that the biology of cyanobacteria has been clarified, as evidenced by references in the prior art to "blue-green algae." Such evidence of recent uncertainty regarding the biology of cyanobacteria tends to rebut, rather than support, the PTO's position that one would consider the cyanobacteria effectively interchangeable with bacteria as hosts for expression of the claimed gene.

At oral argument the PTO referred to additional secondary references, not cited against any independent claim (i.e., Friedberg, Miller, and Nierwitzki-Bauer), which it intended disclose certain amino acid sequence homology between bacteria and cyanobacteria. The PTO argued that such homology is a further suggestion to one of ordinary skill to attempt the claimed invention. We disagree. As with the Dzelzalhs, Sekar I, Sekar II, and Ganasan references discussed above, none of these additional references disclose or suggest that cyanobacteria could serve as hosts for expression of genes encoding *Bacillus* insecticidal proteins.

In *O'Farrell*, this court affirmed an obviousness rejection of a claim to a method for the capability of undergoing oxygenic photosynthesis (not surprisingly, cyanobacteria unique among prokaryotes). However, these references do not suggest that cyanobacteria would be equally attractive hosts for expression of *unrelated* heterologous genes, such as the claimed genes encoding *Bacillus* insecticidal proteins. In *O'Farrell*, this court affirmed an obviousness rejection of a claim to a method for producing a "predetermined protein in a stable form" in a transformed bacterial host. 853 F.2d at 895, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1674. The cited references included a prior art publication (the Polisky reference) whose three authors included two of the three co-inventor-appellants. The main difference between the prior art and the claim at issue was that in Polisky, the heterologous gene was a gene for ribosomal RNA, while the claimed invention substituted a gene coding for a predetermined protein. Id. at 801, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1679. Although, as the appellants therein pointed out, the ribosomal RNA gene is not normally translated into protein, Polisky mentioned preliminary evidence that the transcript of the ribosomal RNA gene was translated into protein, and further predicted that if a gene coding for a protein were to be substituted, extensive translation might result. Id. We thus affirmed, explaining that the prior art explicitly suggested the substitution that is the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art, and presented preliminary evidence suggesting that the [claimed] method could be used to make proteins.

<sup>21</sup> *Siedman's Medical Dictionary* 1139 (24th ed. 1982) (definition of "Procyotae"). Prokaryotic organisms are commonly classified according to the following taxonomic hierarchy: Kingdom;

art would lead those of ordinary skill to conclude that cyanobacteria are attractive hosts for expression of any and all heterologous genes. Again, we can not. The relevant prior art does indicate that cyanobacteria are attractive hosts for expression of both native and heterologous genes involved in photosynthesis (not surprisingly, for the capability of undergoing oxygenic photosynthesis is what makes the cyanobacteria unique among prokaryotes). However, these references do not suggest that cyanobacteria would be equally attractive hosts for expression of *unrelated* heterologous genes, such as the claimed genes encoding *Bacillus* insecticidal proteins.

In *O'Farrell*, this court affirmed an obviousness rejection of a claim to a method for producing a "predetermined protein in a stable form" in a transformed bacterial host. 853 F.2d at 895, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1674. The cited references included a prior art publication (the Polisky reference) whose three authors included two of the three co-inventor-appellants. The main difference between the prior art and the claim at issue was that in Polisky, the heterologous gene was a gene for ribosomal RNA, while the claimed invention substituted a gene coding for a predetermined protein. Id. at 801, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1679. Although, as the appellants therein pointed out, the ribosomal RNA gene is not normally translated into protein, Polisky mentioned preliminary evidence that the transcript of the ribosomal RNA gene was translated into protein, and further predicted that if a gene coding for a protein were to be substituted, extensive translation might result. Id. We thus affirmed, explaining that the prior art explicitly suggested the substitution that is the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art, and presented preliminary evidence suggesting that the [claimed] method could be used to make proteins.

...

<sup>22</sup> The enablement rejection in this case was not based upon a post-filing date state of the art, as in *In re Hogan*, 559 F.2d 595, 605-07, 194 U.S.P.O. 527, 536-38 (CCPA 1977). See also *United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461, 1464 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing *Hogan*; *Hormone Research Found. Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.*, 904 F.2d 1558, 1568-69, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, 104-05 (Fed.Cir.1990)).

<sup>23</sup> Division; Class; Order; Family; Genus; Species; 3 *Bergey's Manual of Systematic Bacteriology* 1601 (1989).

... Polisky contained detailed enabling specification, appellants contend that any methodology for practicing the claimed invention, a suggestion to modify the prior art to practice the claimed invention, and evidence suggesting that it would be successful.

*Id.* at 901-02, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1679-80.

In contrast with the situation in *O'Farrell*, the prior art in this case offers no suggestion, explicit or implicit, of the substitution that is the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art. Moreover, the "reasonable expectation of success" that was present in *O'Farrell* is not present here. Accordingly, we reverse the § 103 rejections.

#### B. Enablement

[4] The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires, *inter alia*, that the specification of a patent enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains to make and use the claimed invention. Although the statute does not say so, enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without "undue experimentation." *In re Wands*, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1404 (Fed.Cir.1988). That some experimentation may be required is not fatal; the issue is whether the amount of experimentation required is "undue." *Id.* at 736-37, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404. Enablement, like obviousness, is a question of law which we independently review, although based upon underlying factual findings which we review for clear error. *See id.* at 735, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402.

[5] In response to the § 112 rejection, appellants assert that their invention is "pioneering," and that this should entitle them to claims of broad scope. Narrower claims would provide no real protection, appellants argue, because the level of skill in this art is so high, art workers could easily avoid the claims. Given the disclosure in their specification to the scope of enablement provided by the specification).<sup>22</sup> Accordingly,

<sup>22</sup> The enablement rejection in this case was not based upon a post-filing date state of the art, as in *In re Hogan*, 559 F.2d 595, 605-07, 194 U.S.P.O. 527, 536-38 (CCPA 1977). See also *United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461, 1464 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing *Hogan*; *Hormone Research Found. Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.*, 904 F.2d 1558, 1568-69, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, 104-05 (Fed.Cir.1990)).

<sup>23</sup> To consider effect of *Hogan* and *United States Steel* on the enablement analysis of *Fisher*, cert. dismissed, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1434, 113 L.Ed.2d 485 (1991). We therefore do not

we affirm the § 112 rejection as to those claims. Although these claims are not limited to expression of genes encoding particular *Bacillus* proteins, we note what appears to be an extensive understanding in the prior art of the numerous *Bacillus* proteins having toxicity to various insects. The rejection of claims 47-48 under § 112 will not be sustained.

#### CONCLUSION

*Angstadt*, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03, 190 U.S.P.Q. 214, 218 (CCPA 1976). However, there must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology, to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. This means that the disclosure must adequately guide the art worker to determine, without undue experimentation, which species among all those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed utility. Where, as here, a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of disclosure will be greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a "predictable" factor such as a mechanical or electrical element. See *Fisher*, 427 F.2d at 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 24. In this case, we agree with the PTO that appellants' limited disclosure does not enable one of ordinary skill to make and use the invention as now recited in claims 1-46 and 50-51 without undue experimentation.

Remaining dependent claim 47 recites a cyanobacterium which expresses the chimeric gene of claim 1, wherein the cyanobacterium is selected from among the genera *Anacystis* and *Synechocystis*. Claim 48, which depends from claim 47, is limited to the cyanobacterium *Synechocystis* 6803. The PTO did not separately address these claims, nor indicate why they should be treated in the same manner as the claims encompassing all types of cyanobacteria. Consider the effect of *Hogan* and its progeny on *Fisher's* analysis of when an inventor should be allowed to "dominate the future patentable inventions of others." *Fisher*, 427 F.2d at 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 24.

Although these claims are not limited to expression of genes encoding particular *Bacillus* proteins, we note what appears to be an extensive understanding in the prior art of the numerous *Bacillus* proteins having toxicity to various insects. The rejection of claims 47-48 under § 112 will not be sustained. Even if I thought this opinion were more persuasive than the board's, I could consider the effect of *Hogan* and its progeny on *Fisher's* analysis of when an inventor should be allowed to "dominate the future patentable inventions of others." *Fisher*, 427 F.2d at 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 24.

The first paragraph of § 112 requires nothing more than objective enablement. *In re Marzocchi*, 439 F.2d 220, 169 U.S.P.Q. 367, 369 (CCPA 1971). How such a teaching is set forth, either by the use of illustrative examples or by broad terminology, is irrelevant. *Id.*

not join it because it misperceives the role of the court.

The scope and content of the prior art, the similarity between the prior art and the claims, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and what the prior art teaches are all questions of fact. *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693-94, 15 L.Ed.2d 545, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459, 467 (1966); *Jurgens v. McKey*, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1991).

Anderson v. City of Basemore City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The mere denomination of obviousness as a question of law does not give the court license to decide the factual matters afresh and ignore the requirement that they be respected unless clearly erroneous. *In re Woolnough*, 919 F.2d 1675, 1677, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1934, 1935 (Fed.Cir.1990); *In re Kulling*, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1056, 1057 (Fed.Cir.1990). There may be more than one way to look at the prior art, but on this record we are bound by the PTO's interpretation of the evidence because it is not clearly erroneous and its conclusion is unassailable. I would affirm on that basis.

1. United States § 147(1)  
Prosecution of equitable adjustment claim before contracting officer was not a "civil action" within meaning of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and thus contractor was not entitled to recover fees incurred by contract claim consultant for preparation of equitable adjustment claim.

2. United States § 147(5)  
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

3. United States § 147(4)  
In formulating an award of attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), court may adjust statutory cap governing rate of attorney fees upward to account for an increase in cost of living. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).

LEVERNIE CONSTRUCTION,  
INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v.  
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant-  
Appellant,  
No. 91-5058.

United States Court of Appeals,  
Federal Circuit.  
Oct. 22, 1991.

Construction contractor sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal